Can we apply R2P to Burma?
Facing up to our responsibilities
Given the Burmese regime's inflexibility so far, there may be a case under international law for forcing it to accept disaster relief
Gareth Evans
May 12, 2008
Given the Burmese regime's inflexibility so far, there may be a case under international law for forcing it to accept disaster relief
Gareth Evans
May 12, 2008
If the intransigence of the Burmese generals continues, we will have to face the question of whether in the name of humanity some international action should be taken against their will - like military air drops, or supplies being landed from ships - to get aid to the huge numbers who desperately need it, right now, in the inaccessible coastal area in particular.
Last Thursday, Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, argued, as others are now doing, that this is a proper case for coercive intervention under the "responsibility to protect" principle unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN world summit. His proposal that the security council pass a resolution which "authorises the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government" met with immediate rejection not only from China and Russia, who are always sensitive about intervention in internal affairs, but from many other quarters as well.
It generated concern from the UK and others, including senior UN officials, that such an "incendiary" approach would be wholly counterproductive in winning any still-possible cooperation from the generals. It also provoked the argument from humanitarian relief agencies - who know what they are talking about - that simply as a practical matter any effort to drop supplies without an effective supporting relief on the ground would be hopelessly inefficient, and maybe even dangerous, with the prospect of misuse of medical supplies.
These are strong arguments, and they weigh heavily in the policy balance. But as the days go by, with relief efforts impossibly hindered, only a trickle of the government's own aid getting through, and the prospect of an enormously greater death toll looming acutely within just a few more days, they are sounding less compelling, and at the very least, need revisiting.
My own initial concern, and it remains a serious one, with Kouchner's invocation of the "responsibility to protect" was that, while wholly understandable as a political rallying cry - and God knows the world needs them in these situations - it had the potential to dramatically undercut international support for another great cause, to which he among others is also passionately committed, that of ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.
The point about "the responsibility to protect" as it was originally conceived, and eventually embraced at the world summit - as I well know, as one of the original architects of the doctrine, having co-chaired the international commission that gave birth to it - is that it is not about human security generally, or protecting people from the impact of natural disasters, or the ravages of HIV-Aids or anything of that kind.
Read the full commentary... Last Thursday, Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, argued, as others are now doing, that this is a proper case for coercive intervention under the "responsibility to protect" principle unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN world summit. His proposal that the security council pass a resolution which "authorises the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government" met with immediate rejection not only from China and Russia, who are always sensitive about intervention in internal affairs, but from many other quarters as well.
It generated concern from the UK and others, including senior UN officials, that such an "incendiary" approach would be wholly counterproductive in winning any still-possible cooperation from the generals. It also provoked the argument from humanitarian relief agencies - who know what they are talking about - that simply as a practical matter any effort to drop supplies without an effective supporting relief on the ground would be hopelessly inefficient, and maybe even dangerous, with the prospect of misuse of medical supplies.
These are strong arguments, and they weigh heavily in the policy balance. But as the days go by, with relief efforts impossibly hindered, only a trickle of the government's own aid getting through, and the prospect of an enormously greater death toll looming acutely within just a few more days, they are sounding less compelling, and at the very least, need revisiting.
My own initial concern, and it remains a serious one, with Kouchner's invocation of the "responsibility to protect" was that, while wholly understandable as a political rallying cry - and God knows the world needs them in these situations - it had the potential to dramatically undercut international support for another great cause, to which he among others is also passionately committed, that of ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.
The point about "the responsibility to protect" as it was originally conceived, and eventually embraced at the world summit - as I well know, as one of the original architects of the doctrine, having co-chaired the international commission that gave birth to it - is that it is not about human security generally, or protecting people from the impact of natural disasters, or the ravages of HIV-Aids or anything of that kind.
PEP Coordinator
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UN Peacekeeping Salon
From April 21-28 2008, Mark Malan, the Peacebuilding Program Officer for Refugees International and Executive Coordinator for the PEP, participated in an online UN peacekeeping salon that facilitated dialogue regarding a paper written by William Durch of the Stimson Center that discussed the peacekeeping challenges awaiting the upcoming administration in 2009. The online discussion, hosted by UN Dispatch and Foreign Policy Passport, featured a total of five participants and two moderators.
To read the discussion blogs and learn more about past salons sponsored by UN Dispatch, follow the link below:
UN DPKO "Capstone Doctrine" document complete...
9 April, 2008
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines
Principles and Guidelines
A key priority for DPKO/DFS in the past year has been the development of an overarching guidance document, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, that aims to provide practitioners and partners with a comprehensive overview of the principles and concepts guiding the planning and conduct of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations. To develop this landmark document, DPKO engaged in a wide consultative process involving a series of “expert-level”, regional workshops, which brought together representatives of the major troop and police contributors, donor countries, UN staff and leading academics. Consultations were also held with Member States and UN system partners in New York to ensure that their views and concerns were fully taken into account. The document constitutes the first attempt in over a decade to clarify the nature and scope of UN peacekeeping operations for the benefit of peacekeeping practitioners and partners. It should be considered a living document that will need to be updated and reviewed to reflect the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations.
"Over the past six decades, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into a complex, global undertaking. During this time, the conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been guided by a largely unwritten body of principles and informed by the experiences of the many thousands of men and women who have served in the more than 60 operations launched since 1948. This document captures these experiences for the benefit and guidance of planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations."
Expectations of UN Peacekeeping in Darfur...
Peacekeepers Without a Peace to Keep
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
October 14, 2007
IF anyone needed proof that Darfur has degenerated into a peacekeeper’s nightmare, 30 truckloads of armed men forcefully delivered it two weekends ago.
They stormed a small African Union garrison in a dusty village, Haskanita, and massacred 10 African peacekeepers, looted their equipment and torched their base. The attack came as the African Union was preparing for a critical peace conference on Darfur and the United Nations was rushing to assemble a beefed-up force that will total 26,000 soldiers under joint U.N.-African Union command — the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.
Is the intervention too late? Or maybe, as some experts argue, too early?
The problem with Darfur is that it is not a Kosovo, an East Timor, or a Cyprus, all places where United Nations blue helmets have stepped between well-defined warring parties and stopped the bloodshed. Darfur is experiencing a different, messier kind of war.
Though often simplified, the situation in Darfur has become a chaotic free-for-all with many warring pieces, Arab versus Arab, rebel versus rebel, bandit versus bandit, all fighting one another in a desiccated, burned-out wasteland overrun with weapons and increasingly lethal for aid workers and peacekeepers.
If anything, Darfur resembles Somalia in the 1990s, when the failure of American-backed United Nations peacekeepers to subdue teenage gunmen in flip-flops ushered in 16 years of chaos that rages on today.
“Unless Unamid,” the abbreviation for the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, “develops a strategy, wises up very fast to the complexity of the conflict in 2007 and gets out of its fortresses, which is more unlikely than ever post-Haskanita, it will very soon become a major part of the problem,” said Julie Flint, a London-based journalist and co-author of “Darfur: A Short History of a Long War.” She cited the amount of water peacekeepers would consume — up to 40 times per person what a typical Darfurian uses, the burden on already broken roads and communications, and the huge expectations the force’s arrival will create.
“Darfurians are expecting to be saved by Unamid, to have roads opened, the janjaweed disarmed and banditry ended,” she said. This, she added, is “mission impossible,” however well the troops perform.
Impossible or not, some experts emphasized that if the force is to have any chance of success, it must be willing to fight robustly and take casualties.
Read the full article ...
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
October 14, 2007
IF anyone needed proof that Darfur has degenerated into a peacekeeper’s nightmare, 30 truckloads of armed men forcefully delivered it two weekends ago.
They stormed a small African Union garrison in a dusty village, Haskanita, and massacred 10 African peacekeepers, looted their equipment and torched their base. The attack came as the African Union was preparing for a critical peace conference on Darfur and the United Nations was rushing to assemble a beefed-up force that will total 26,000 soldiers under joint U.N.-African Union command — the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.
Is the intervention too late? Or maybe, as some experts argue, too early?
The problem with Darfur is that it is not a Kosovo, an East Timor, or a Cyprus, all places where United Nations blue helmets have stepped between well-defined warring parties and stopped the bloodshed. Darfur is experiencing a different, messier kind of war.
Though often simplified, the situation in Darfur has become a chaotic free-for-all with many warring pieces, Arab versus Arab, rebel versus rebel, bandit versus bandit, all fighting one another in a desiccated, burned-out wasteland overrun with weapons and increasingly lethal for aid workers and peacekeepers.
If anything, Darfur resembles Somalia in the 1990s, when the failure of American-backed United Nations peacekeepers to subdue teenage gunmen in flip-flops ushered in 16 years of chaos that rages on today.
“Unless Unamid,” the abbreviation for the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, “develops a strategy, wises up very fast to the complexity of the conflict in 2007 and gets out of its fortresses, which is more unlikely than ever post-Haskanita, it will very soon become a major part of the problem,” said Julie Flint, a London-based journalist and co-author of “Darfur: A Short History of a Long War.” She cited the amount of water peacekeepers would consume — up to 40 times per person what a typical Darfurian uses, the burden on already broken roads and communications, and the huge expectations the force’s arrival will create.
“Darfurians are expecting to be saved by Unamid, to have roads opened, the janjaweed disarmed and banditry ended,” she said. This, she added, is “mission impossible,” however well the troops perform.
Impossible or not, some experts emphasized that if the force is to have any chance of success, it must be willing to fight robustly and take casualties.
Read the full article ...
1 Reference
September PEP Forum - The Responsibility to Protect
September PEP Forum
Friday 28, 2007
3:00pm to 5:00pm
CSIS - 1800 K St. 4th Floor Conference Room
Topic of Discussion:
The Responsibility to Protect
Speakers:
Ms. Ingrid Harder
R2P Consultant to the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ms. Sapna Chhatpar Considine
Program Officer -R2P Project for the World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy
Ms. Harder is currently working as a consultant to Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, on initiatives related to the Responsibility to Protect. Following the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect by the 2005 World Summit, the government of Canada has been engaged in efforts to further promote and implement this set of principles. On this front, the Canadian government has a history of working collaboratively with civil society organizations. Over the past year, there has been a significant increase in interest in this issue among civil society groups in Washington. In order to gain a better understanding of the diverse range of views on this subject, Ingrid is interested in how the Responsibility to Protect is being interpreted as well as how, if at all, it is being incorporated into various programs and activities. She will provide an introductory briefing on Canada's approach and her work to date on R2P follow up, followed by a discussion .
A full agenda to follow.
If you are interested in attending, please RSVP to coordinator@effectivepeacekeeping.org
Friday 28, 2007
3:00pm to 5:00pm
CSIS - 1800 K St. 4th Floor Conference Room
Topic of Discussion:
The Responsibility to Protect
Speakers:
Ms. Ingrid Harder
R2P Consultant to the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ms. Sapna Chhatpar Considine
Program Officer -R2P Project for the World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy
Ms. Harder is currently working as a consultant to Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, on initiatives related to the Responsibility to Protect. Following the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect by the 2005 World Summit, the government of Canada has been engaged in efforts to further promote and implement this set of principles. On this front, the Canadian government has a history of working collaboratively with civil society organizations. Over the past year, there has been a significant increase in interest in this issue among civil society groups in Washington. In order to gain a better understanding of the diverse range of views on this subject, Ingrid is interested in how the Responsibility to Protect is being interpreted as well as how, if at all, it is being incorporated into various programs and activities. She will provide an introductory briefing on Canada's approach and her work to date on R2P follow up, followed by a discussion .
A full agenda to follow.
If you are interested in attending, please RSVP to coordinator@effectivepeacekeeping.org