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The Global Peace Operations Initiative

PEP

BRIEFING NOTE

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A Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP) Publication

The PEP is a non-partisan policy working group that brings together the humanitarian, human rights, peace and security, think tank, and academic communities in support of greater peace operations capacity. The PEP promotes public policy solutions to improve national and international peacekeeping infrastructure, and works to build the political will to support such policies by: providing an open forum for discussion of peace operations issues; serving as an information resource for media and policymakers; and engaging in educational efforts that facilitate greater understanding of peace operations. The PEP does not exclusively support any one particular solution for the capacity problems that prevent effective peacekeeping operations. Rather, the PEP facilitates the exploration of all potential pragmatic and achievable solutions in a candid and 'outside the box' atmosphere.

Introduction

In June 2004, President Bush sought and received support for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) from his counterparts at the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia. GPOI is a sensible plan to help expand global capacity for peace and stability operations. The Bush administration anticipates that GPOI will require a \$660 million contribution over five years from the U.S.

However, around two-thirds of the total expenditure for GPOI activities is expected to come from international contributions. Although the UN is not involved in GPOI, the program intends to build capabilities that can in turn enhance UN peace operations by improving the forces contributed to those operations. Consequently, the UN is supportive of GPOI and its objectives.

Enhancing Peacekeeping Capacity Globally

- *Training and equipping up to 75,000 additional peacekeeping troops worldwide, by the year 2010.*

The global supply of military troops and civilian police for international peace operations is sorely stretched. In late 2005, the total number of peacekeepers was just under 70,000, with troops coming from 107 nations. With NATO countries occupied in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and the U.S. bogged down in Iraq, there are precious few well-qualified military troops and even fewer police available for peacekeeping operations in Africa and other areas.

Though Africa has been the location for the majority of peacekeeping missions in the past decade, the number of African troops available for peacekeeping has grown little over the same period. As a result, most peacekeeping missions must make do with small numbers of troops that lack sufficient training and equipment to effectively carry out the mandate for the mission.

- *Developing better transportation and logistics support arrangements to facilitate effective peacekeeping operations.*

Too often UN peacekeeping operations are hampered by the inability to get troops to the places they are needed. Furthermore, when peacekeeping troops from developing countries are deployed, it is often without functioning transportation and communications equipment, ammunition for their weapons, and appropriate clothing for the climate.

While recent improvements to the UN's logistical supply base at Brindisi, Italy have been helpful, the base has nevertheless been rapidly exhausted by the demands of current operations. To be more effective, UN peacekeeping troops must have access to armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, and air transport. These are things only developed countries, and primarily only the U.S., can provide.

The experience of the African Union (AU) in Sudan has also illustrated the importance of this part of the GPOI. While the AU has taken a productive approach in leading the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, western countries have had to finance the deployment of many of the African soldiers, and have paid for the bases and ongoing logistical needs of the AU mission.

- *Creation of a medium for exchange among African partners, the UN, the EU, and others to maximize individual and multilateral peacekeeping efforts with a focus on Africa; and organizing coordination meetings related to peace support operations.*

Numerous attempts have been undertaken since the early nineties to enhance African peacekeeping capacity. Nevertheless, the number of African troops available for peacekeeping has barely increased over the past decade. Furthermore, the U.S., the EU, and certain EU member states have devoted significant funds to programs for building peacekeeping capacity in Africa that may well have overlapped each other. Greater coordination among G-8 members is needed to ensure that funds and efforts to build African and global peacekeeping capacity are used efficiently and lead to measurable improvements.

- *Providing support and assistance to regional and sub-regional organizations to improve their ability to plan and initiate peace operations.*

Peacekeeping operations are increasingly taken on not just by the UN, but also by international, regional, and sub-regional entities such as the European Union, NATO, the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The spread of conflict across borders in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire) and the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda) illustrates the need for regional approaches to peacekeeping.

- *Increasing contributions to stability police forces, also known as gendarmerie or constabulary police, by supporting existing programs in Europe and Africa, encouraging the creation of new initiatives, and providing assistance to the Italian initiative to establish a Center of Excellence which will make use of the expertise of the Italian Carabinieri and the French Gendarmerie to provide training for future international policing missions in peacekeeping operations.*

A key problem in the immediate post-conflict environment is that a special sort of police capacity is needed. Widespread looting and rioting, organized crime, and extremist activities such as terrorism require a response that falls between the overwhelming force doctrine and capabilities of the military and the minimum force policing techniques of ordinary law enforcement.

Stability police, found in European states such as France, Spain, and Italy, can meet this need in peace operations. Stability police forces receive both police and military training, and can deploy as formed units with their own communications, logistical support, and command structures already in place. They are trained to deal with situations that might overwhelm ordinary police, but are not a job for combat soldiers.

- *Developing common doctrines and standards for stability police missions in peacekeeping operations in regard to crowd control, election security, protection of sensitive facilities, VIP security, and border control, and operating training programs and courses with additional pre-deployment preparations for specific missions.*

The use of stability police is not a panacea. In many post-conflict societies the line between the military and the police may have become blurred, and the security forces may have been part of the conflict and the oppression of civilians. For example, many European powers left behind constabulary police forces in their former colonies, and the U.S. created constabulary police forces in several countries in the

Caribbean. Many of these forces were subsequently perverted and misused by despotic regimes to consolidate and hold onto power.

Given this legacy, intervening stability police forces might provoke a negative reaction from the civilian population. Efforts to explain the role of the international stability police will have to accompany their deployment. Common doctrines and well-maintained standards of conduct will therefore assist in ensuring that stability police missions accomplish their tasks successfully, in cooperation with those they are trying to help.

GPOI – Plans and Action

The aim of GPOI is twofold—to allow nations to contribute more and better-trained troops to UN peacekeeping operations, and to increase the potential of regional and sub-regional organizations to conduct peace operations in their own neighborhoods should the need arise.

As African nations present the greatest demand for peacekeeping, GPOI is focusing its peacekeeping capacity-building efforts on that continent, where it has overtaken and expanded upon a predecessor, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Strengthened efforts to build the peacekeeping capacity of African forces include training more battalions, increasing the number of partner countries, carrying out multinational exercises and adding specialized trainings. GPOI also seeks to increase the headquarters (HQ) capabilities of both the AU and ECOWAS by training HQ staff, providing advisors and technical assistance and supplying communications equipment. There also exists the prospect of eventually providing HQ support to an African Standby Force.

GPOI is also intended to advance the peacebuilding capabilities of forces in Latin America, Europe and Asia. As in Africa, in these regions GPOI will strive to work through regional and sub-regional organizations to achieve its goals. Efforts will include bilateral trainings, specialized training in areas such as engineering and medicine, and peace support exercises.

GPOI also proposes to address existing transportation and logistical challenges to deploying peacekeeping forces rapidly and smoothly to areas in crisis. To alleviate such problems, G-8 members and other interested partners have committed to developing effective transportation and logistics support arrangements.

To facilitate better G-8 coordination on capacity-building endeavors, GPOI calls for G-8 expert-level meetings to generate a clearinghouse for the exchange of information. This clearinghouse is to continue as long as necessary for the effectual implementation of GPOI initiatives. The U.S. hosted the first meeting of the G-8 Clearinghouse in October 2004, and the UK will host this year's meeting in London in December. International, regional and sub-regional organizations send representatives to these meetings. The U.S. has also volunteered to develop a G-8 Clearinghouse website, www.G-8AfricaPSO.net, on which G-8 members can list their activities aimed at enhancing African peace support capabilities.

Recognizing the usefulness of gendarme-like stability police in peacekeeping operations to bridge the gap between military forces and civilian police, GPOI also includes support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) established by Italy's Carabinieri Force in Vicenza in March 2005. CoESPU has adopted a train-the-trainer approach, pledging to train 3000 Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers by the end of 2010 who will then return to their countries and train at least 4,500 additional personnel. CoESPU also intends to serve as a center for developing doctrine, establishing common operational procedures, and assessing lessons learned in the field of stability policing.

To augment the classroom training provided at the center, CoESPU will also establish mobile training

teams to reinforce and sustain forces' skills in the field. The internationally staffed CoESPU began its first class in early November 2005. The work of CoESPU has received strong support from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is deploying Formed Police Units (stability police) to various UN peace operations around the globe.

Background – Unorthodox FY05 Funding and Resulting Problems

Although GPOI is a presidential initiative, and also appears to enjoy bipartisan support in both chambers of Congress, FY05 GPOI funding was nearly derailed in late 2004 because of opposition from certain Congressional Republicans, primarily key members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In late 2004, recognizing there was no spare funding in the State Department's FY05 budget, the Bush administration placed responsibility for the program with State but told the Defense Department it would have to provide funding for the initial year. Key Members of Congress balked at allowing Defense appropriated funds (the 050 account) to be transferred to the State Department (the 150 account), for a variety of reasons, some jurisdictional, others ideological.

A late White House intervention rescued funding for GPOI. Congress eventually authorized the Defense Department to transfer up to \$80 million to the State Department for peacekeeping capacity building activities. Unfortunately, the way Congress funded GPOI for FY05 proved problematic. There has been reorganization within the State Department, creating regional offices for various parts of the planned GPOI activities, and a more senior leader is running GPOI. Yet it was not until late July 2005 that the Defense Department finally transferred funds—\$80 million—to the State Department for GPOI.

The GPOI funding issue proved particularly problematic for CoESPU, which appeared to have the most traction of all the GPOI programs when it actually began operation early in 2005. The U.S. promised \$10 million in 2004 to help establish the Center. However, although the Italians met their obligation, the U.S. was unable to provide the \$10 million to Italy until late summer 2005.

Future Outlook: FY06 Funding and Program Implementation

Nevertheless, funding for FY06 was a better story. The House provided \$96.4 million for the GPOI program in the FY06 Foreign Operations appropriation bill, a reduction from the Administration request. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided the President's full request, \$114 million, for GPOI, in the FY06 State and Foreign Operations appropriation bill.

The funding survived mostly intact during the House-Senate conference, and as enacted in public law, \$175 million was provided for the "Peacekeeping Operations" sub-account (which is where the GPOI appropriation is found). This was a reduction from \$177 million as proposed by the House and \$195 million as proposed by the Senate.

As GPOI moves forward, there are several issues to consider. State and Defense Department analysts, as well as outside organizations, should assess whether previous peacekeeping capacity building efforts have paid lasting dividends or just delivered short-term impacts. With the African Union working to build its peacekeeping capacity, and the European Union assisting with that process, the U.S. should avoid duplicative efforts and the mistakes made by itself and others.

Better peacekeeping is not about better soldiers, better training, better equipment, better logistical support, or better doctrine. It is about all those things, and more, combined into one unified and effective effort. The implementation of GPOI will need to be properly configured to deliver upon those fundamental needs.