

MAY 2006

Peacebuilding is a U.S. National Security Interest with No Funding

PEP BRIEFING NOTE

www.effectivepeacekeeping.org

1705 N STREET NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
(202) 828-0110

A Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP) Publication

The PEP is a non-partisan policy working group that brings together the humanitarian, human rights, peace and security, think tank, and academic communities in support of greater peace operations capacity. The PEP promotes public policy solutions to improve national and international peacekeeping infrastructure, and works to build the political will to support such policies by: providing an open forum for discussion of peace operations issues; serving as an information resource for media and policymakers; and engaging in educational efforts that facilitate greater understanding of peace operations. The PEP does not exclusively support any one particular solution for the capacity problems that prevent effective peacekeeping operations. Rather, the PEP facilitates the exploration of all potential pragmatic and achievable solutions in a candid and 'outside the box' atmosphere.

Introduction

For peace to find stable footing in societies emerging from conflict, there must exist the same political and economic institutions and infrastructure that provide solid ground for peace in other nations. Creating these institutions in post-war settings requires significant time and resources. Yet war-torn nations often lose the attention of the international community too soon after the guns are put down; nearly half of countries that celebrate a peace agreement will tumble back into conflict within five years.

The challenges to peacebuilding are numerous. The large set of activities found within a peacebuilding effort often take place in settings where some level of conflict persists and where institutional capacity is needed that often did not exist previously. Successful peacebuilding requires a holistic approach and a lengthy commitment of resources, but this investment can produce better results than inaction. As costly as protracted peacebuilding is, it is far cheaper than protracted conflict.

National Security Presidential Directive

The U.S. government is showing awareness that peacebuilding must follow peace brokering. On December 7, 2005, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) to improve coordination and planning among government agencies in providing stabilization and reconstruction assistance to areas emerging from, experiencing, or on the verge of conflict.

The directive states that the U.S. should collaborate with other nations and organizations to forestall state failure when possible and, when states do collapse, to respond quickly to promote peace, democracy and open economies. The document casts stabilization assistance as a critical function that serves U.S. national security interests, particularly through strengthening foreign governments' capabilities to fend off "extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests."

The directive designates the State Department as the central organizer of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization assistance. The Secretary of State, with support from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, is to lead interagency and contingency planning for conflict prevention and resolution and ensure the effective use of agencies' respective response capabilities. The Secretary's specific tasks include:

- informing U.S. decision makers of viable options for stabilization activities;
- coordinating U.S. efforts with those of other governments, international and regional organizations, NGOs and private companies;
- seeking input from individuals and organizations with country-specific expertise;
- leading development of a robust civilian response capability with a prompt deployment capacity and civilian reserve;
- gleaning lessons learned and integrating them into operations; and
- resolving relevant policy, program or funding disputes among U.S. agencies and departments.

The directive further emphasizes coordination in conflict response between the Secretaries of State and Defense. They will develop a joint framework for harmonizing reconstruction and stabilization plans with military activities. The President's directive also establishes a Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, of which the Chairs will be the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a National Security Council staff member.

Defense Directive 3000.05

The instatement of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 on November 28th 2005 further indicates the increased value placed on stability operations. The directive labels reconstruction and stability operations "a core U.S. military mission," ascribing to them a priority level comparable to that of combat operations. Military plans must now integrate stability operations as appropriate, and such operations should undergo the same exercises and gaming processes as combat plans.

The purpose of DoD stability efforts is to instill order in a manner conducive to the advancement of U.S. interests. In the short-term, stability operations aim to provide immediate security and address humanitarian concerns in an area affected by conflict, while the long-term goal is to establish an indigenous capacity to sustain a stable, democratic and free-market society.

The directive states that U.S. military forces will defer responsibility for stability operations to civilian professionals whenever possible, calling for widespread development and employment of military-civilian teams. The directive puts the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in charge of DoD stability operations preparedness.

The USD(P) is to advise the Secretary of Defense in the area of stability operations policy, providing the Secretary with a semiannual report on the Department's progress in implementing the directive. The USD(P) will also create a stability operations center to coordinate relevant research, training and lessons learned, and must develop a process for sharing information on stability operations with other US agencies, foreign governments, international institutions, NGOs, and members of the private sector. The Chairman's role is to identify and lead the development of DoD capabilities for stability operations. This task includes developing joint doctrine for stability operations, overseeing the development and assessment of relevant training, and establishing effectiveness standards to measure overall progress towards building the needed capabilities.

Analysis

Efforts to bolster the civilian capabilities within the U.S. government for stabilization and reconstruction may be enhanced by NSPD 44. By providing a Presidential mandate for the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bush administration may have improved its chances of getting necessary funding for U.S. government civilian stabilization and reconstruction activities and capabilities.

On the other hand, the Bush administration in its FY2007 Budget Request has only asked for \$75 million for the Conflict Response Fund, designed to provide immediate deployment funding in a crisis situation. A more realistic cost estimate for this fund is \$200 million, and an additional \$200 million is required to establish and fund a civilian Active Response Corps and fund a civilian reserve capacity for stabilization and reconstruction activities, neither of which was requested by the administration. Furthermore, Congress once again appears intent on ignoring this problem and refusing to provide resources to fund civilian capabilities and activities.

Other concerns include ambiguity between DoD 3000.05 and NSPD 44. Some observers feel, for instance, that there is not sufficient clarity of roles between the State Department and DoD for stability operations. Another concern is the general ambiguity of NSPD 44 itself. It is not clear that government agencies understand how to respond to and implement NSPD 44.

A more important issue for some is the sheer level of resources within DoD as compared to the rest of the U.S. government. What little civilian capacity exists within the U.S. government for stabilization and reconstruction activities is not well-supported by Congress and is only a tiny fraction of available resources within DoD. This is a serious concern because there is general agreement that the civilian role in a stabilization and reconstruction effort is, or should be, the most prominent. Yet the very real risk is that, as Congress continues to fail to fund civilian capacities, DoD capabilities will simply grow to subsume the entire effort. History shows that the military is not well-suited for civilian tasks, and in fact does not want them, so this would presumably not be a desired outcome.