Peacekeeping Reports

Below you will find a compilation of reports related to international peacekeeping, including the latest and most relevant research and information from PEP Partners and Academics, as well as the UN, U.S. Government and Foreign Governments.

Note: The PEP report library is a “comprehensive compilation in progress.” We encourage PEP Partners to submit relevant reports for inclusion on the site.

The Latest Reports

  • From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons from U.S. Experience with DDR and SSR
    By Alison Laporte-Oshiro
    Published November 17, 2011

    Summary

    • Consolidating the legitimate use of force in the hands of the state is a vital first step in post-conflict peacebuilding. Transitional governments must move quickly to neutralize rival armed groups and provide a basic level of security for citizens.

    • Two processes are vital to securing a monopoly of force: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) involve disbanding armed groups that challenge the government’s monopoly of force. Security sector reform (SSR) means reforming and rebuilding the national security forces so that they are professional and accountable.
    • U.S. experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo yielded three crosscutting lessons: go in heavy, tackle DDR and SSR in tandem, and consolidate U.S. capacity to implement both tasks in a coordinated, scalable way.

    This report is based on the panel presentation and the views expressed at a September 12, 2011 meeting of the Security Sector Reform working group. The panel included retired Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND Corp., retired Lt. Gen. David Barno, Center for New American Security, retired Ambassador John Blaney, Deloitte Consulting LLP and Melanne Civic, the Center for Complex Operations. Robert Perito, the Director of USIP’s Security Sector Governance Center, moderated the panel.

    Security Sector Reform, All Regions | Posted November 29, 2011
  • U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation
    By Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping
    Published October 19, 2011

    Citizens for Global Solutions, as part of the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, has released a new report entitled, "U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation." The report calls on Congress and the Obama Administration to improve U.S. participation in international peacekeeping operations and offers recommendations in four areas:

    1) U.S. funding of U.N. peacekeeping
    2) Women in peacekeeping
    3) Training and Equipping Peacekeepers
    4) Standing Civilian and Police Capacity

    Download the report below, or visit Citizens for Global Solutions' website for more information. 

    United States, US Gov't Peacekeeping Issues | Posted October 19, 2011
  • The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities
    By Paul D. Williams
    Published October 1, 2011

    Overview

    In this Working Paper, Paul D. Williams clarifies how Africa's strategic importance to the United States has increased substantially over the past decade. In particular, the continent is a growing source of U.S. energy imports; it houses suspected terrorists; and it offers profitable business opportunities, especially in the energy, telecommunication, and minerals sectors. As Chinese and Indian influence spread and explicitly challenge the U.S. development model, Africa is an arena of intensifying great power rivalry. And, critically, Africa remains the major epicenter for mass atrocities as well as a potential source of transcontinental health pandemics. Consequently, stabilizing the continent should be a core U.S. policy goal.

    The African Union (AU) has great potential as a U.S. partner in Africa. Unfortunately, the AU's practical capabilities in the field of conflict management suffer from a persistent capabilities-expectations gap, falling well short of the ambitious vision and rhetoric contained in its founding documents. The AU's shortcomings are not fatal, however; the U.S. government can bolster AU conflict management capacity in the near and long terms.

    Africa, African Union Peacekeeping | Posted November 16, 2011
  • Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
    By Max Kelly with Alison Giffen
    Published September 1, 2011

    Since 1999, an increasing proportion of UN peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) have been mandated to use force to protect civilians from physical violence. Although recent research and UN efforts have helped clarify that the protection of civilians (POC) is a critical and unavoidable requirement for UN PKOs, its implications for UN planning, and particular planning for the military component, prior to and during deployment remain largely unaddressed in formal guidance.  Recent initiatives by DPKO and individual missions to develop guidance, conceptual tools, and working methods to implement POC mandates have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity.

    This document is intended to support those processes by drawing on recent scholarship and operational research on the challenges of ending complex civil conflicts. It seeks to apply that research to better employ the military capabilities of UN PKOs to alter conflict dynamics in order to end attacks on civilians. Drawing on lessons from recent UN PKOs and interviews with mission personnel from a wide variety of contexts, it proposes a shift from a primarily reactive approach based on crisis response, to a proactive one that seizes the initiative and applies pressure on armed actors responsible for violence against the civilian populace.

    Protection of Civilians, All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted November 16, 2011
  • Partners in Preventive Action: The U.S. and International Institutions
    By Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko
    Published September 1, 2011

    Overview

    The unipolar moment, to the extent it ever existed, has now truly passed. The United States is part of a globalized world, in which the flows of goods, finance, people, and much more connect us to other countries as never before. But for all the myriad benefits globalization brings, it also means that the challenges of the coming decades—be they generated by resource competition, climate change, cybercrime, terrorism, or clas­sic competition and rivalry—cannot be solved or even mitigated by one country alone. Countries will need to cooperate on policies that extend across borders to address issues that affect them all.

    In this Council Special Report, CFR scholars Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko argue that the United States should increasingly look to international institutions—the United Nations and regional organiza­tions like the European Union, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—as partners in conflict prevention and peacemaking worldwide. These organizations can serve as a platform for developing and enforcing international norms; provide a source of legitimacy for diplomatic and military efforts; and aggregate the opera­tional resources of their members, all of which can increase the ease and effectiveness of American peacemaking efforts.

    All Regions, US Gov't Peacekeeping Issues | Posted November 16, 2011
  • Considerations For A New Peacekeeping Operation In South Sudan
    By Alison Giffen
    Published May 4, 2011

    Following the secession of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, preventing violence against civilians in the new state and along its northern border will remain a priority - if not the primary challenge - for the international community. South Sudan is rife with conflict. The United Nations' top aid official in the South reported that 800 people have died in violence, and almost 94,000 people have fled their homes since the start of 2011. The UN Secretariat, UNSC Member States, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), and many humanitarian and human rights NGOs are undertaking assessments, preparing planning documents, and considering the future role of a UN presence in the newest state in Africa.

    As such, the Stimson Center has published the report: "Considerations for a New Peacekeeping Operation in South Sudan: Preventing Conflict and Protecting Civilians." The working paper seeks to inform debates around the future peacekeeping force by analyzing and applying recent research, policies, best practices, and lessons learned on protection and peacekeeping to the situation in South Sudan.

    Africa, UN Peace Operations | Posted May 4, 2011
  • DR Congo: Support Community-Based Tools for MONUSCO
    By Erin Weir and Charles Hunt
    Published May 3, 2011

    In recent years the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has faced tremendous pressure to improve civilian protection in the volatile and violent eastern provinces of the country.  The mission has seen its share of high-profile protection failures – including the mass rape of over 200 women, men and children in August of 2010.  But MONUSCO is at the forefront of innovative tactics to protect civilians. In order to sustain and maximize these new efforts, however, the mission requires additional civilian and logistical capacity.  MONUSCO also requires new information management and analysis systems in order to facilitate moving from a reactive to genuinely preventive protection posture. 

    POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

    1) The U.S and other members of the UN Security Council must maintain Protection of Civilians as a top priority, and prevent the diversion of scarce protection resources by keeping election-related MONUSCO tasks to the bare minimum.

    2) MONUSCO leadership should request that a full-time Protection of Civilians information analyst be hired to capture the analysis generated in the provincial capitals of Goma, Bukavu and Bunia and identify mission-level protection needs and trends.

    3) The MONUSCO Provincial-level Senior Management Groups on Protection should work together to develop a system that captures information collected by the Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) and Joint Protection Teams, and allows for analysis and action in a way that ensures the safety of mission staff and of the civilians providing them with information.

    4) The UN Fifth Committee should approve additional CLA posts, as well as additional provincial-level posts to support the training and management of their staff and to provide critical logistical and administrative support to the CLA program.

    Read the report here

    Africa, Protection of Civilians, UN Peace Operations | Posted May 3, 2011
  • Côte D’Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping, Impartiality And Protection Of Civilians
    By Rebecca Friedrichs
    Published April 20, 2011

    Last week, forces loyal to President Ouattara seized Former President Laurent Gbagbo from his home, ending a stalemate that began after elections in November 2010.  The recent events in Côte d'Ivoire have reignited the debate about impartiality, neutrality and protection of civilians.  The United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) has come under scrutiny for its use of force against Gbagbo's compound and weaponry.  In light of criticism, it is important to reflect on the meaning of "impartiality" and remind skeptics that UNOCI was not obligated to remain neutral in the conflict.

    From April 4 to Gbagbo's surrender on April 10, UNOCI launched strikes against Gbagbo facilities and pro-Gbagbo heavy weaponry in a pro-active effort to protect civilians in the commercial capital of Abidjan.  The UN's decision to act during this volatile time has made it easy for those opposed to the mission to portray it as an international intervention aimed at deposing Gbagbo and therefore an overstep of its mandate. Critics included Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who claimed, "The peacekeepers have a mandate which obliged them to stay neutral and impartial." This serves to remind us that even those involved in UN affairs do not always differentiate between the concepts of "impartiality" and "neutrality."

    Historically, UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to uphold interstate peace agreements and neutrally monitor borders and disputed territories.  In the post-Cold War environment however, peacekeeping missions have been increasingly deployed to countries characterized by intrastate war. Facing new challenges and more complex environments, the United Nations struggled to remain neutral and effective in the face of clear belligerents and victims. Responding to this challenge in 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("The Brahimi Report") shifted away from neutrality and concluded that impartiality was a bedrock principle of UN peacekeeping. Describing the meaning of impartiality, the report states that:

    Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement." 

    Elaborating on the pitfalls of neutrality in current situations, the report also explains that "where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil."  In this way, UN peacekeeping is not to permit or ignore clear violations of the peace process or violations of international norms and UN Charter principles.

    The peacekeeping mission UNOCI was created in 2004 to monitor the implementation of a January 2003 peace agreement that ended the Ivoirian Civil War.  The Chapter VII mandate included clauses of impartiality and mandated the protection of civilians, and in 2007, UNOCI was further tasked with certifying the upcoming elections.  After numerous delays, the presidential election was finally held this past November and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Choi Young-Jin certified Ouattara as the winner.  EU, AU and ECOWAS all acknowledged Ouattara, but former President Gbagbo refused to concede and relinquish his power.  The stalemate that followed presented UNOCI with numerous obstacles.  The Gbagbo government withdrew consent for the mission, but the UN remained at the request of President Ouattara and UNOCI's mandate was extended on December 20.  Designating UNOCI troops as foreign invaders, Gbagbo called on his supporters to target them.  As a result of this call to violence, UNOCI personnel have been injured and assets have been destroyed by armed combatants on both sides of the conflict. 

    Upon escalation of the conflict and rising civilian casualties, regional leaders urged the Security Council to give UNOCI a stronger mandate.  The result was Resolution 1975 (March 2011), which tasked UNOCI, along with the aid of French troops, with "impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence...including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population."  The UN Security Council deemed that civilians were under threat of imminent violence: pro-Gbagbo forces repeatedly fired rocket-propelled grenades against UNOCI personnel and used armored carriers equipped with machine guns to fire indiscriminately at civilians.  UNOCI had the right to use force in self defense and had the mandate to protect those citizens and do what they could to destroy the weapons.

    As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon clarified on April 11, "The United Nations, together with [French] forces, have...been trying to prevent heavy weapons from killing the civilian population, and we really had to defend the United Nations peacekeepers' safety and security...This is exactly what we did in accordance with the Security Council mandate."  Nevertheless, the Secretary-General's statement may not be enough to silence critics like Foreign Minister Lavrov. Suggesting that the use of force makes a peacekeeping mission partial has dangerous implications for missions elsewhere. Current UN peacekeeping missions such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Haiti also have mandates that contain language of impartiality and also authorize the use of force for the protection of civilians. 

    Peacekeeping missions are increasingly deployed into conflicts where civilians are targeted and there is little peace to keep.  In these complex situations the difference between impartiality and neutrality is critical: a mandate to protect civilians means that sometimes UN peacekeepers are faced with the difficult task of becoming involved in and shaping the conflict.

    link to: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/cote-divoire-un-peacekeeping-impartiality-and-protection-of-civilians/

    Africa, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 28, 2011
  • Fundamentals Of Protecting Civilians
    By Alison Giffen
    Published April 7, 2011

    President Obama has used the protection of civilians as the primary rationale for initiating military action in Libya, with the support of the UN Security Council. Libya isn't the only country in crisis where interventions have been undertaken with an explicit objective to protect civilians. Ten UN peacekeeping operations have been authorized to use force to protect civilians - most recently in the Ivory Coast, where attack helicopters are being used to neutralize artillery that could be used against civilians in Abidjan. Beyond peacekeeping, the Coalition commanders in Afghanistan have released tactical directives on the protection of civilians. 

    The U.S. Administration, for political and practical reasons, is working to clarify what it means by the "protection of civilians," why it is a U.S. strategic interest and when and how the concept should be applied. President Obama began to address these issues in his March 28 speech at the National Defense University. But messaging is important insofar as words are followed by deeds on the ground.

    The What

    The concept of Protection of Civilians has primarily been used to describe activities undertaken during consent-based interventions such as UN peacekeeping operations mandated and authorized to use force to protect civilians (as defined by international humanitarian law) under imminent threat of physical violence. The Obama Administration and the Security Council have now used the concept as the rationale for the non-consensual intervention in Libya. Given non-consensual interventions directly challenge international norms of sovereignty and usually require the application of greater military force, they are inherently more controversial and carry a different set of risks then consent-based interventions to protect civilians. The Administration and its allies would be well served to make a distinction between consent-based and non-consensual interventions to protect civilians so that the successes or failures of one do not undermine or artificially accelerate progress on the other.

    The Why

    Although the U.S. government has begun to adopt policies to prevent and respond to atrocities, guidance and doctrine (specific to the protection of civilians) for deployed military have yet to be developed. With such uncertainty, why should the United States and the international community risk action?  There are moral, legal, practical and strategic reasons.

    -     In the 28 March speech, the President said "if we waited one more day, Benghazi ... could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world."

    -     Leaders have also raised legal reasons, sighting international humanitarian and human rights laws and nascent norms that outline an international responsibility to protect.

    -     "The writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution's future credibility to uphold global peace and security."  (President Obama, March 28, 2011)

    The third reason - practical and strategic - is the most critical. In today's conflicts, failing to act undermines the legitimacy and credibility of governments and inter-governmental bodies. A UN or coalition failure in one arena has implications for its actions in others.

    Why is legitimacy and credibility so important in today's conflicts? The revolution in communication technology allows the capture and transmission of real or rumored abuses and atrocities in real time. This information has altered civilian engagement and influence in the outcome of war. How the conflicting parties, and international actors that intervene, are perceived affects how stakeholders on the ground (civilians that can either support a nascent state or an armed actor that challenges that state) and around the globe (voters and tax payers that are needed to support politicians and programs that fund interventions abroad) see their interests.  

    The How

    The international community has to adhere to at least three fundamentals in an intervention that aims to protect civilians:

    1)  Political Strategy. Military power remains a blunt instrument that is primarily designed to defeat an enemy, not to protect civilians. Although doctrine and guidance is being considered to guide militaries, sustainable peace and protection of rights requires a political strategy to decide whether military force is being used to freeze a conflict in order to bring parties to the table or to mitigate the risk to civilians while a conflict plays out. Once conflict ebbs, what strategy will bring diverse stakeholders to the table to find an appropriate way forward?

    2) Positioning. The intervention should provide protection in an impartial fashion. In other words, the decision on whether and how to intervene should be primarily based on stopping the atrocity, not on who is perpetrating it. In the case of Libya, that means being clear that NATO is not siding with one armed actor or another and will protect civilians regardless of who is attacking them. Such a position can help deter rebels from targeting civilians or undertaking offensive operations that may harm civilians (beyond the bounds of international humanitarian law) and combat assertions that the operation is being undertaken for spurious reasons.

    3) Planning.   Effective planning for protection operations is critical to their success. If the protection of civilians is the principal objective of the operation, then every political, economic and military course of action must be designed to reduce harm to civilians. Such planning requires a deep understanding of the conflict dynamics. A very condensed summary of planning considerations include:

    →     Identify which civilians are at risk, why and what actions they might take to protect themselves.

    →     Identify who is threatening or perpetrating violence against civilians, why and how.

    →     Choose courses of action that A) undermine or remove the ability of the perpetrators to attack civilians and  B) reduce the vulnerability of the civilians at risk.

    →     Anticipate and plan to mitigate potential negative consequences of these actions (in the short, medium and long-term) to civilians.

    Looking Ahead

    The President's 28 March speech at NDU touched on almost every fundamental outlined above - looking to a political solution and avoiding the issue of regime change through military power. Thus far, the NATO coalition seems to be following the fundamentals. But given the fact that several nations in the coalition - including the United States - have declared that regime change is a national policy goal, pressures to (a) arm or train rebels on one side of the conflict, (b) cobble together peace agreements that may be contested, and/or (c) legitimize governments that may be unrepresentative and corrupt could well contribute to further violence and abuse. Such actions undermine all three of the fundamentals outlined above and could tarnish the credibility and legitimacy of the protection of civilian doctrine, and the coalition effort as well.

    Calls by the United States and allies for Qadhafi to step down should be separate from the military operation, based on his clear violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law, and part of a political strategy that differentiates between Qadhafi and those directly responsible for abuses, and others who may need to be included in Libya's future government. 

    link to: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/fundamentals-of-protecting-civilians/

    Protection of Civilians, All Regions | Posted April 28, 2011
  • The Case for UN Peacekeeping
    By Micah Zenko and Rebecca R. Friedman
    Published March 2, 2011

    While UN peacekeeping is in need of overarching reforms, it is too easy to forget the essential role it plays in promoting U.S. foreign policy goals. UN peacekeeping missions underpin stability in Lebanon, Haiti, Somalia, and the Indo-Pakistani border region of Kashmir. UN missions are also critical to solidifying American gains after U.S. troops leave; it is UN peacekeepers who have prevented the resurgence of violence in post-conflict areas like the Sinai desert, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In an era where a dwindling number of allies are willing to contribute to international peace and security, the UN is a reliable partner with the United States in many troubled regions--often willing to work alongside, or in lieu of, U.S. soldiers.

    As Washington gears up for a tough budgetary fight, the White House must make the case for UN peacekeeping. At no other time in its sixty-three-year history has UN peacekeeping needed the United States more, nor has the United States ever needed UN peacekeeping so much. And only by shoring up support at home can President Barack Obama establish a platform for more vigorous U.S. leadership at the UN.

    http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/case-un-peacekeeping/p24277

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted March 3, 2011

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