Peacekeeping Reports

Below you will find a compilation of reports related to international peacekeeping, including the latest and most relevant research and information from PEP Partners and Academics, as well as the UN, U.S. Government and Foreign Governments.

Note: The PEP report library is a “comprehensive compilation in progress.” We encourage PEP Partners to submit relevant reports for inclusion on the site.

The Latest Reports

  • DR Congo: Support Community-Based Tools for MONUSCO
    By Erin Weir and Charles Hunt
    Published May 3, 2011

    In recent years the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has faced tremendous pressure to improve civilian protection in the volatile and violent eastern provinces of the country.  The mission has seen its share of high-profile protection failures – including the mass rape of over 200 women, men and children in August of 2010.  But MONUSCO is at the forefront of innovative tactics to protect civilians. In order to sustain and maximize these new efforts, however, the mission requires additional civilian and logistical capacity.  MONUSCO also requires new information management and analysis systems in order to facilitate moving from a reactive to genuinely preventive protection posture. 

    POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

    1) The U.S and other members of the UN Security Council must maintain Protection of Civilians as a top priority, and prevent the diversion of scarce protection resources by keeping election-related MONUSCO tasks to the bare minimum.

    2) MONUSCO leadership should request that a full-time Protection of Civilians information analyst be hired to capture the analysis generated in the provincial capitals of Goma, Bukavu and Bunia and identify mission-level protection needs and trends.

    3) The MONUSCO Provincial-level Senior Management Groups on Protection should work together to develop a system that captures information collected by the Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) and Joint Protection Teams, and allows for analysis and action in a way that ensures the safety of mission staff and of the civilians providing them with information.

    4) The UN Fifth Committee should approve additional CLA posts, as well as additional provincial-level posts to support the training and management of their staff and to provide critical logistical and administrative support to the CLA program.

    Read the report here

    Africa, Protection of Civilians, UN Peace Operations | Posted May 3, 2011
  • Côte D’Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping, Impartiality And Protection Of Civilians
    By Rebecca Friedrichs
    Published April 20, 2011

    Last week, forces loyal to President Ouattara seized Former President Laurent Gbagbo from his home, ending a stalemate that began after elections in November 2010.  The recent events in Côte d'Ivoire have reignited the debate about impartiality, neutrality and protection of civilians.  The United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) has come under scrutiny for its use of force against Gbagbo's compound and weaponry.  In light of criticism, it is important to reflect on the meaning of "impartiality" and remind skeptics that UNOCI was not obligated to remain neutral in the conflict.

    From April 4 to Gbagbo's surrender on April 10, UNOCI launched strikes against Gbagbo facilities and pro-Gbagbo heavy weaponry in a pro-active effort to protect civilians in the commercial capital of Abidjan.  The UN's decision to act during this volatile time has made it easy for those opposed to the mission to portray it as an international intervention aimed at deposing Gbagbo and therefore an overstep of its mandate. Critics included Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who claimed, "The peacekeepers have a mandate which obliged them to stay neutral and impartial." This serves to remind us that even those involved in UN affairs do not always differentiate between the concepts of "impartiality" and "neutrality."

    Historically, UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to uphold interstate peace agreements and neutrally monitor borders and disputed territories.  In the post-Cold War environment however, peacekeeping missions have been increasingly deployed to countries characterized by intrastate war. Facing new challenges and more complex environments, the United Nations struggled to remain neutral and effective in the face of clear belligerents and victims. Responding to this challenge in 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("The Brahimi Report") shifted away from neutrality and concluded that impartiality was a bedrock principle of UN peacekeeping. Describing the meaning of impartiality, the report states that:

    Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement." 

    Elaborating on the pitfalls of neutrality in current situations, the report also explains that "where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil."  In this way, UN peacekeeping is not to permit or ignore clear violations of the peace process or violations of international norms and UN Charter principles.

    The peacekeeping mission UNOCI was created in 2004 to monitor the implementation of a January 2003 peace agreement that ended the Ivoirian Civil War.  The Chapter VII mandate included clauses of impartiality and mandated the protection of civilians, and in 2007, UNOCI was further tasked with certifying the upcoming elections.  After numerous delays, the presidential election was finally held this past November and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Choi Young-Jin certified Ouattara as the winner.  EU, AU and ECOWAS all acknowledged Ouattara, but former President Gbagbo refused to concede and relinquish his power.  The stalemate that followed presented UNOCI with numerous obstacles.  The Gbagbo government withdrew consent for the mission, but the UN remained at the request of President Ouattara and UNOCI's mandate was extended on December 20.  Designating UNOCI troops as foreign invaders, Gbagbo called on his supporters to target them.  As a result of this call to violence, UNOCI personnel have been injured and assets have been destroyed by armed combatants on both sides of the conflict. 

    Upon escalation of the conflict and rising civilian casualties, regional leaders urged the Security Council to give UNOCI a stronger mandate.  The result was Resolution 1975 (March 2011), which tasked UNOCI, along with the aid of French troops, with "impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence...including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population."  The UN Security Council deemed that civilians were under threat of imminent violence: pro-Gbagbo forces repeatedly fired rocket-propelled grenades against UNOCI personnel and used armored carriers equipped with machine guns to fire indiscriminately at civilians.  UNOCI had the right to use force in self defense and had the mandate to protect those citizens and do what they could to destroy the weapons.

    As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon clarified on April 11, "The United Nations, together with [French] forces, have...been trying to prevent heavy weapons from killing the civilian population, and we really had to defend the United Nations peacekeepers' safety and security...This is exactly what we did in accordance with the Security Council mandate."  Nevertheless, the Secretary-General's statement may not be enough to silence critics like Foreign Minister Lavrov. Suggesting that the use of force makes a peacekeeping mission partial has dangerous implications for missions elsewhere. Current UN peacekeeping missions such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Haiti also have mandates that contain language of impartiality and also authorize the use of force for the protection of civilians. 

    Peacekeeping missions are increasingly deployed into conflicts where civilians are targeted and there is little peace to keep.  In these complex situations the difference between impartiality and neutrality is critical: a mandate to protect civilians means that sometimes UN peacekeepers are faced with the difficult task of becoming involved in and shaping the conflict.

    link to: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/cote-divoire-un-peacekeeping-impartiality-and-protection-of-civilians/

    Africa, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 28, 2011
  • Fundamentals Of Protecting Civilians
    By Alison Giffen
    Published April 7, 2011

    President Obama has used the protection of civilians as the primary rationale for initiating military action in Libya, with the support of the UN Security Council. Libya isn't the only country in crisis where interventions have been undertaken with an explicit objective to protect civilians. Ten UN peacekeeping operations have been authorized to use force to protect civilians - most recently in the Ivory Coast, where attack helicopters are being used to neutralize artillery that could be used against civilians in Abidjan. Beyond peacekeeping, the Coalition commanders in Afghanistan have released tactical directives on the protection of civilians. 

    The U.S. Administration, for political and practical reasons, is working to clarify what it means by the "protection of civilians," why it is a U.S. strategic interest and when and how the concept should be applied. President Obama began to address these issues in his March 28 speech at the National Defense University. But messaging is important insofar as words are followed by deeds on the ground.

    The What

    The concept of Protection of Civilians has primarily been used to describe activities undertaken during consent-based interventions such as UN peacekeeping operations mandated and authorized to use force to protect civilians (as defined by international humanitarian law) under imminent threat of physical violence. The Obama Administration and the Security Council have now used the concept as the rationale for the non-consensual intervention in Libya. Given non-consensual interventions directly challenge international norms of sovereignty and usually require the application of greater military force, they are inherently more controversial and carry a different set of risks then consent-based interventions to protect civilians. The Administration and its allies would be well served to make a distinction between consent-based and non-consensual interventions to protect civilians so that the successes or failures of one do not undermine or artificially accelerate progress on the other.

    The Why

    Although the U.S. government has begun to adopt policies to prevent and respond to atrocities, guidance and doctrine (specific to the protection of civilians) for deployed military have yet to be developed. With such uncertainty, why should the United States and the international community risk action?  There are moral, legal, practical and strategic reasons.

    -     In the 28 March speech, the President said "if we waited one more day, Benghazi ... could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world."

    -     Leaders have also raised legal reasons, sighting international humanitarian and human rights laws and nascent norms that outline an international responsibility to protect.

    -     "The writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution's future credibility to uphold global peace and security."  (President Obama, March 28, 2011)

    The third reason - practical and strategic - is the most critical. In today's conflicts, failing to act undermines the legitimacy and credibility of governments and inter-governmental bodies. A UN or coalition failure in one arena has implications for its actions in others.

    Why is legitimacy and credibility so important in today's conflicts? The revolution in communication technology allows the capture and transmission of real or rumored abuses and atrocities in real time. This information has altered civilian engagement and influence in the outcome of war. How the conflicting parties, and international actors that intervene, are perceived affects how stakeholders on the ground (civilians that can either support a nascent state or an armed actor that challenges that state) and around the globe (voters and tax payers that are needed to support politicians and programs that fund interventions abroad) see their interests.  

    The How

    The international community has to adhere to at least three fundamentals in an intervention that aims to protect civilians:

    1)  Political Strategy. Military power remains a blunt instrument that is primarily designed to defeat an enemy, not to protect civilians. Although doctrine and guidance is being considered to guide militaries, sustainable peace and protection of rights requires a political strategy to decide whether military force is being used to freeze a conflict in order to bring parties to the table or to mitigate the risk to civilians while a conflict plays out. Once conflict ebbs, what strategy will bring diverse stakeholders to the table to find an appropriate way forward?

    2) Positioning. The intervention should provide protection in an impartial fashion. In other words, the decision on whether and how to intervene should be primarily based on stopping the atrocity, not on who is perpetrating it. In the case of Libya, that means being clear that NATO is not siding with one armed actor or another and will protect civilians regardless of who is attacking them. Such a position can help deter rebels from targeting civilians or undertaking offensive operations that may harm civilians (beyond the bounds of international humanitarian law) and combat assertions that the operation is being undertaken for spurious reasons.

    3) Planning.   Effective planning for protection operations is critical to their success. If the protection of civilians is the principal objective of the operation, then every political, economic and military course of action must be designed to reduce harm to civilians. Such planning requires a deep understanding of the conflict dynamics. A very condensed summary of planning considerations include:

    →     Identify which civilians are at risk, why and what actions they might take to protect themselves.

    →     Identify who is threatening or perpetrating violence against civilians, why and how.

    →     Choose courses of action that A) undermine or remove the ability of the perpetrators to attack civilians and  B) reduce the vulnerability of the civilians at risk.

    →     Anticipate and plan to mitigate potential negative consequences of these actions (in the short, medium and long-term) to civilians.

    Looking Ahead

    The President's 28 March speech at NDU touched on almost every fundamental outlined above - looking to a political solution and avoiding the issue of regime change through military power. Thus far, the NATO coalition seems to be following the fundamentals. But given the fact that several nations in the coalition - including the United States - have declared that regime change is a national policy goal, pressures to (a) arm or train rebels on one side of the conflict, (b) cobble together peace agreements that may be contested, and/or (c) legitimize governments that may be unrepresentative and corrupt could well contribute to further violence and abuse. Such actions undermine all three of the fundamentals outlined above and could tarnish the credibility and legitimacy of the protection of civilian doctrine, and the coalition effort as well.

    Calls by the United States and allies for Qadhafi to step down should be separate from the military operation, based on his clear violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law, and part of a political strategy that differentiates between Qadhafi and those directly responsible for abuses, and others who may need to be included in Libya's future government. 

    link to: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/fundamentals-of-protecting-civilians/

    Protection of Civilians, All Regions | Posted April 28, 2011
  • The Case for UN Peacekeeping
    By Micah Zenko and Rebecca R. Friedman
    Published March 2, 2011

    While UN peacekeeping is in need of overarching reforms, it is too easy to forget the essential role it plays in promoting U.S. foreign policy goals. UN peacekeeping missions underpin stability in Lebanon, Haiti, Somalia, and the Indo-Pakistani border region of Kashmir. UN missions are also critical to solidifying American gains after U.S. troops leave; it is UN peacekeepers who have prevented the resurgence of violence in post-conflict areas like the Sinai desert, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In an era where a dwindling number of allies are willing to contribute to international peace and security, the UN is a reliable partner with the United States in many troubled regions--often willing to work alongside, or in lieu of, U.S. soldiers.

    As Washington gears up for a tough budgetary fight, the White House must make the case for UN peacekeeping. At no other time in its sixty-three-year history has UN peacekeeping needed the United States more, nor has the United States ever needed UN peacekeeping so much. And only by shoring up support at home can President Barack Obama establish a platform for more vigorous U.S. leadership at the UN.

    http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/case-un-peacekeeping/p24277

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted March 3, 2011
  • Being a Peacekeeper: The Challenges and Opportunities of 21st-Century Peace Operations
    Published February 28, 2011

    In its 2010 report, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) emphasized the need to broaden the base of troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs). The Special Committee further recommended that “coordinated initiatives be taken to reach out to new contributors, that former and existing contributors be encouraged to contribute further and that support to emerging contributors be provided.” The joint IPI-Pearson Being a Peacekeeper Series is a response, in part, to those recommendations. The November 2010 roundtable was just the beginning of a conversation. Future meetings, both in New York and in regional capitals, will provide space for continued dialogue among TCCs and PCCs in 2011.

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted February 28, 2011
  • Update Report No. 2: Interdependence Between Security & Development
    Published February 9, 2011

    On 11 February, at the initiative of Brazil, the Council will hold an open debate on the interdependence between security and development.

    The debate will be presided over by Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota. Five other Council members (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Germany, India and Portugal) have indicated that their foreign ministers will be in attendance. The Secretary-General is expected to provide a UN Secretariat perspective on this issue. Sarah Cliffe, Special Representative and Director of World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development, is also expected to address the Council.

    http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6554261/k.B2FB/Update_Report_No_2brInterdependence_Between_Security_and_Developmentbr9_February_2011.htm

    Security Sector Reform, All Regions | Posted February 22, 2011
  • Mainstreaming Crime Control in Peace Operations and Development
    By Walter Kemp and Ian Hrovatin
    Published February 8, 2011

    The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and mandates the deployment of the approximately 100,000 blue helmets engaged in peace operations. But this approach has its limitations when it comes to crime control. Organized crime is a threat to stability in almost every theater where the UN is active in keeping or building the peace.

    How well equipped is the UN to address the challenges in order to promote peace and development and reduce vulnerability to transnational organized crime? 

    http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_epub_mainstreamingcrime.pdf

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted February 8, 2011
  • Study: Sexual Violence within Eastern DRC
    By Kirsten Johnson, Jennifer Scott, Bigy Rughita and Michael Kisielewski
    Published February 8, 2011

    Context: Studies from the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have provided anecdotal reports of sexual violence. This study offers a population-based assessment of the prevalence of sexual violence and human rights abuses in specific territories within Eastern DRC.

    Objective: To assess the prevalence of and correlations with sexual violence and human rights violations on residents of specific territories of Eastern DRC including information on basic needs, health care access, and physical and mental health.

    Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional, population-based, cluster survey of 998 adults aged 18 years or older using structured interviews and questionnaires, conducted over a 4-week period in March 2010.

    Main Outcome Measures: Sexual violence prevalence and characteristics, symptoms of major depressive disorder (MDD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), human rights abuses, and physical and mental health needs among Congolese adults in specific territories of Eastern DRC.

    Results: Of the 1005 households surveyed 998 households participated, yielding a response rate of 98.9%. Rates of reported sexual violence were 39.7% (95% confidence interval [CI], 32.2%-47.2%; n=224/586) among women and 23.6%(95%CI, 17.3%- 29.9%; n=107/399) among men.  Women reported to have perpetrated conflict-related sexual violence in 41.1%(95%CI, 25.6%-56.6%; n=54/148) of female cases and 10.0% (95%CI,1.5%-18.4%;n=8/66)ofmale cases. Sixty-sevenpercent (95%CI,59.0%-74.5%; n=615/998) of households reported incidents of conflict-related human rights abuses. Fortyone percent (95%CI, 35.3%-45.8%; n=374/991) of the represented adult population met symptomcriteria forMDDand 50.1%(95%CI, 43.8%-56.3%; n=470/989) for PTSD.  

    Conclusion: Self-reported sexual violence and other human rights violations were prevalent in specific territories of Eastern DRC and were associated with physical and mental health outcomes.

    http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/JAMA_AssociationofSexualViolenceandHumanRightsViolationswithPhysicalandMentalHealthinTerritoriesoftheEDRC.pdf

    Africa, UN Peace Operations | Posted February 8, 2011
  • The Future of SSR
    By Mark Sedra
    Published February 8, 2011

    "The Future of Security Sector Reform" e-conference took place on May 4-8, 2009. CIGI and Governance Village organized the event. This e-Conference report outlines some of the urgent challenges that must be addressed for the SSR model to bridge the policy-practice divide and realize its core aims.

    http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/The%20Future%20of%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf

    Security Sector Reform, All Regions | Posted February 8, 2011
  • Comment/Analysis: Cholera, Haiti and MINUSTAH: What Implications for Peacekeeping?
    By Arthur Boutellis
    Published January 11, 2011

    http://www.ipacademy.org/news/comment-a-analysis/211-cholera-haiti-and-minustah-what-implications-for-peacekeeping.html

    January 12, 2011 marks the first anniversary of the devastating earthquake that killed over 200,000 in Haiti and left 1.5 million homeless. The UN suffered the largest loss of life in its history that day with the collapse of the headquarters of its Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in Port-au-Prince.

    But despite the death of 101 UN employees, including the mission chief, Hédi Annabi, and his deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa, the mission was able to make a significant contribution to the post-earthquake rescue and relief efforts, largely thanks to its military component. The need to support recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts led the Security Council a week later to pass a resolution increasing the size of MINUSTAH by 2,000 troops and 1,500 police.

    Now, a year later, however, in the midst of a political and electoral crisis, segments of the Haitian population in large cities have turned against UN peacekeepers, tying the outbreak of cholera that has claimed over 3,000 Haitian lives to UN soldiers from Nepal, where the disease is endemic. Under pressure from various scientific and news reports pointing to MINUSTAH Nepalese troops as being the most likely source of the epidemic, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on January 6th named four top medical experts to an independent panel to investigate the cause of the epidemic in Haiti.

    The outcome of this investigation will be key to the future of MINUSTAH. If the Nepalese camp is found not to have been the origin of the disease, then it is essential for the UN to prove it in order to maintain the trust of the people that is essential for MINUSTAH’s effective function.

    By contrast, if MINUSTAH has failed so notably in its safety standards and environmental protection, it will have to acknowledge that, learn from it and deal with it responsibly. Whatever the outcome of the panel’s work, it should make concrete recommendations on ways to reach out to the Haitian people and make clear what happened and what steps are being taken to prevent a recurrence.

    I was in Haiti working for MINUSTAH when the cholera epidemic was first detected in mid-October. MINUSTAH’s early press communiqués proved to be no match against the Haitian rumor mill tracked by local and international media and the politically manipulated November 15th anti-MINUSTAH protests that resulted in two civilian deaths. The position of the mission was rendered all the more difficult by the fact that it has no mandate for cholera response. Its mandate is only to provide security and to set up a stable atmosphere in which others can then come to aid Haitians.

    In a welcome departure from initial UN denials of problems in the sanitation system at its Nepalese base, the Secretary-General said in announcing the panel in mid-December that the UN wants "to make the best effort to get to the bottom of this and find answers that the people of Haiti deserve."

    Some implications for the mission were immediate. Its 1,000 Nepalese troops (about 9% of overall MINUSTAH military) could no longer take part in securing the December elections. The development did irreparable damage to MINUSTAH’s image among the Haitian people, which was exarcebated by local media claims that it was an "occupying force."

    This anti-MINUSTAH sentiment has undermined the ability of UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs to carry out cholera response, both because of deteriorating security and because they are conflated in the public mind with MINUSTAH.

    In the longer term, this episode will certainly damage the organization’s credibility as a whole and will provide further arguments for those calling for lighter footprints. The July 2010 UN Global Field Support Strategy states that "the mission impact objectives are to fully utilize local and regional investment and capacity, and to reduce the in-country environmental impact of peacekeeping."

    Nepalese soldiers all passed medical examination before departure, and waste management for their camp was subcontracted to a Haitian company. So whose responsibility would it be then if the camp is really at the origin of the disease?

    This also raises the issue of the partnership between the UN and its troop contributors. A country with a long and respected record of participating in peacekeeping, Nepal is currently the fourth largest troop contributor to peacekeeping operations around the world. Yet its patrols in the streets of Haiti are at risk of being targeted by the population, and the UN has stopped the deployment of additional Nepalese-formed police units. At the same time, the current Nepalese contingent cannot leave the country before the investigation is completed, as its departure would be interpreted as an admission of guilt. The current situation finally raises the question of whether in the future other countries hosting peacekeeping operations will accept the deployment of troops from Nepal or other troop-contributing countries where cholera or other communicable diseases and epidemics exist.

    Although it remains unclear whether the independent panel will be able to establish the origin of the disease and attribute responsibility, its creation should be welcomed. Peacekeeping in Haiti and elsewhere will be effective only if it continues to have the consent and cooperation of a country’s authorities and people. Persisting accusations only feed into the Haitian distrust of international actors—including of much-needed humanitarians—in an uncertain electoral period during which political manipulations are legion. But this unfortunate episode should also encourage us to rethink the "do no harm" notion and the value of having smaller, more manageable and more cost- effective alternatives to large military peacekeeping presences, particularly in contexts such as Haiti, where longer-term statebuilding processes should be the priority.

    Americas, UN Peace Operations | Posted January 13, 2011

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