Reports by: PEP Partner Organizations

  • DR Congo: Local Communities on the Front Line
    By Erin Weir and Peter Orr
    Refugees International
    Published April 25, 2012

    The day-to-day reality for ordinary people in the Democratic Republic of Congo includes all of the following: latent insecurity, ongoing military operations, and systematic attacks by armed groups – including units of the Congolese military. The international community has been providing humanitarian assistance to the DRC for over a decade and a half, but the need remains acute. The local UN peacekeeping operation (MONUSCO) dedicates the majority of its scarce resources to the protection of civilians, and will need to maintain this critical effort for the foreseeable future. Creative protection efforts by the peacekeepers need to be reinforced and supported. Protection monitoring and coordination efforts – led by the UN Refugee Agency – also need to be repaired.

    Erin Weir and Peter Orr assessed the humanitarian conditions and security situation in the DRC in March 2012 and came to the following policy conclusions:

    - The U.S. and ECHO should provide funds to restore UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) protection monitoring staff in North Kivu to prior levels.
    - Donor governments should call on UNHCR – in its capacity as Protection Cluster lead – to strengthen its work on IDP protection. UNHCR protection monitors should be given the task of tracking IDP movements in order to reinforce OCHA’s information gathering, strengthen overall capacity to project the scale of displacement, and respond with timely and adequate assistance.
    - The U.S. should identify bilateral funding – in addition to the assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping dedicated specifically for the support of additional Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), communications equipment, and transportation.
    - Donor countries – specifically the U.S., the UK, and the EU – and their institutions must coordinate priorities and key conditions for ongoing support to the government of the DRC. Coordinated offers of funding for development projects must be predicated upon progress in the areas of corruption and impunity, as well as a concrete demonstration of will and a plan to make progress in key areas such as the reform of security sector institutions.

    Africa, PoC with Responsibility to Protect, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Protection of Civilians, Security Sector Reform, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 25, 2012
  • UN Integration and Humanitarian Space
    By Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giffen and Samir Elhawary
    Stimson Center
    Published March 12, 2012

    For over two decades, the United Nations has sought to create greater coherence within the UN system. UN integration is part of this push - an attempt to maximise the impact of UN efforts to consolidate peace in conflict and post-conflict states.  The benefits and risks of UN integration for humanitarian action have been subject to intense debate. Some UN humanitarian staff, and many staff in non-UN humanitarian organisations, remain sceptical that UN integration can benefit humanitarian action. Many NGOs are opposed to UN integration, arguing that it blurs the distinction between humanitarian, military and political action and subordinates humanitarian priorities to political prerogatives. Conversely, many in the UN political and peacekeeping community stress the need for enhanced coherence and highlight the positive experiences of UN integration and the significant progress made in policy development and practice in recent years. 

    This independent study, carried out jointly by the Humanitarian Policy Group and the Stimson Center, was commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group to look in detail at the impacts of UN integration on humanitarian action. The study focused on three main case studies (Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia), and was complemented by a desk review of the Central African Republic, Darfur (Sudan) and Liberia. The study looked at the impact of UN integration arrangements on five areas of key humanitarian concern: humanitarian aid worker security, access to beneficiaries, engagement with non-state armed actors, perceptions of humanitarian actors and humanitarian advocacy.

    PoC with Responsibility to Protect, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Protection of Civilians, Security Sector Reform, All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted March 12, 2012
  • U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation
    By Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping
    The PEP
    Published October 19, 2011

    Citizens for Global Solutions, as part of the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, has released a new report entitled, "U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping: From Aspiration to Implementation." The report calls on Congress and the Obama Administration to improve U.S. participation in international peacekeeping operations and offers recommendations in four areas:

    1) U.S. funding of U.N. peacekeeping
    2) Women in peacekeeping
    3) Training and Equipping Peacekeepers
    4) Standing Civilian and Police Capacity

    Download the report below, or visit Citizens for Global Solutions' website for more information. 

    United States, US Gov't Peacekeeping Issues | Posted October 19, 2011
  • Considerations For A New Peacekeeping Operation In South Sudan
    By Alison Giffen
    Henry L. Stimson Center
    Published May 4, 2011

    Following the secession of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, preventing violence against civilians in the new state and along its northern border will remain a priority - if not the primary challenge - for the international community. South Sudan is rife with conflict. The United Nations' top aid official in the South reported that 800 people have died in violence, and almost 94,000 people have fled their homes since the start of 2011. The UN Secretariat, UNSC Member States, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), and many humanitarian and human rights NGOs are undertaking assessments, preparing planning documents, and considering the future role of a UN presence in the newest state in Africa.

    As such, the Stimson Center has published the report: "Considerations for a New Peacekeeping Operation in South Sudan: Preventing Conflict and Protecting Civilians." The working paper seeks to inform debates around the future peacekeeping force by analyzing and applying recent research, policies, best practices, and lessons learned on protection and peacekeeping to the situation in South Sudan.

    Africa, UN Peace Operations | Posted May 4, 2011
  • DR Congo: Support Community-Based Tools for MONUSCO
    By Erin Weir and Charles Hunt
    Refugees International
    Published May 3, 2011

    In recent years the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has faced tremendous pressure to improve civilian protection in the volatile and violent eastern provinces of the country.  The mission has seen its share of high-profile protection failures – including the mass rape of over 200 women, men and children in August of 2010.  But MONUSCO is at the forefront of innovative tactics to protect civilians. In order to sustain and maximize these new efforts, however, the mission requires additional civilian and logistical capacity.  MONUSCO also requires new information management and analysis systems in order to facilitate moving from a reactive to genuinely preventive protection posture. 

    POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

    1) The U.S and other members of the UN Security Council must maintain Protection of Civilians as a top priority, and prevent the diversion of scarce protection resources by keeping election-related MONUSCO tasks to the bare minimum.

    2) MONUSCO leadership should request that a full-time Protection of Civilians information analyst be hired to capture the analysis generated in the provincial capitals of Goma, Bukavu and Bunia and identify mission-level protection needs and trends.

    3) The MONUSCO Provincial-level Senior Management Groups on Protection should work together to develop a system that captures information collected by the Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) and Joint Protection Teams, and allows for analysis and action in a way that ensures the safety of mission staff and of the civilians providing them with information.

    4) The UN Fifth Committee should approve additional CLA posts, as well as additional provincial-level posts to support the training and management of their staff and to provide critical logistical and administrative support to the CLA program.

    Read the report here

    Africa, Protection of Civilians, UN Peace Operations | Posted May 3, 2011
  • Côte D’Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping, Impartiality And Protection Of Civilians
    By Rebecca Friedrichs
    Henry L. Stimson Center
    Published April 20, 2011

    Last week, forces loyal to President Ouattara seized Former President Laurent Gbagbo from his home, ending a stalemate that began after elections in November 2010.  The recent events in Côte d'Ivoire have reignited the debate about impartiality, neutrality and protection of civilians.  The United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) has come under scrutiny for its use of force against Gbagbo's compound and weaponry.  In light of criticism, it is important to reflect on the meaning of "impartiality" and remind skeptics that UNOCI was not obligated to remain neutral in the conflict.

    From April 4 to Gbagbo's surrender on April 10, UNOCI launched strikes against Gbagbo facilities and pro-Gbagbo heavy weaponry in a pro-active effort to protect civilians in the commercial capital of Abidjan.  The UN's decision to act during this volatile time has made it easy for those opposed to the mission to portray it as an international intervention aimed at deposing Gbagbo and therefore an overstep of its mandate. Critics included Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who claimed, "The peacekeepers have a mandate which obliged them to stay neutral and impartial." This serves to remind us that even those involved in UN affairs do not always differentiate between the concepts of "impartiality" and "neutrality."

    Historically, UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to uphold interstate peace agreements and neutrally monitor borders and disputed territories.  In the post-Cold War environment however, peacekeeping missions have been increasingly deployed to countries characterized by intrastate war. Facing new challenges and more complex environments, the United Nations struggled to remain neutral and effective in the face of clear belligerents and victims. Responding to this challenge in 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("The Brahimi Report") shifted away from neutrality and concluded that impartiality was a bedrock principle of UN peacekeeping. Describing the meaning of impartiality, the report states that:

    Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement." 

    Elaborating on the pitfalls of neutrality in current situations, the report also explains that "where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil."  In this way, UN peacekeeping is not to permit or ignore clear violations of the peace process or violations of international norms and UN Charter principles.

    The peacekeeping mission UNOCI was created in 2004 to monitor the implementation of a January 2003 peace agreement that ended the Ivoirian Civil War.  The Chapter VII mandate included clauses of impartiality and mandated the protection of civilians, and in 2007, UNOCI was further tasked with certifying the upcoming elections.  After numerous delays, the presidential election was finally held this past November and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Choi Young-Jin certified Ouattara as the winner.  EU, AU and ECOWAS all acknowledged Ouattara, but former President Gbagbo refused to concede and relinquish his power.  The stalemate that followed presented UNOCI with numerous obstacles.  The Gbagbo government withdrew consent for the mission, but the UN remained at the request of President Ouattara and UNOCI's mandate was extended on December 20.  Designating UNOCI troops as foreign invaders, Gbagbo called on his supporters to target them.  As a result of this call to violence, UNOCI personnel have been injured and assets have been destroyed by armed combatants on both sides of the conflict. 

    Upon escalation of the conflict and rising civilian casualties, regional leaders urged the Security Council to give UNOCI a stronger mandate.  The result was Resolution 1975 (March 2011), which tasked UNOCI, along with the aid of French troops, with "impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence...including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population."  The UN Security Council deemed that civilians were under threat of imminent violence: pro-Gbagbo forces repeatedly fired rocket-propelled grenades against UNOCI personnel and used armored carriers equipped with machine guns to fire indiscriminately at civilians.  UNOCI had the right to use force in self defense and had the mandate to protect those citizens and do what they could to destroy the weapons.

    As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon clarified on April 11, "The United Nations, together with [French] forces, have...been trying to prevent heavy weapons from killing the civilian population, and we really had to defend the United Nations peacekeepers' safety and security...This is exactly what we did in accordance with the Security Council mandate."  Nevertheless, the Secretary-General's statement may not be enough to silence critics like Foreign Minister Lavrov. Suggesting that the use of force makes a peacekeeping mission partial has dangerous implications for missions elsewhere. Current UN peacekeeping missions such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Haiti also have mandates that contain language of impartiality and also authorize the use of force for the protection of civilians. 

    Peacekeeping missions are increasingly deployed into conflicts where civilians are targeted and there is little peace to keep.  In these complex situations the difference between impartiality and neutrality is critical: a mandate to protect civilians means that sometimes UN peacekeepers are faced with the difficult task of becoming involved in and shaping the conflict.

    link to: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/cote-divoire-un-peacekeeping-impartiality-and-protection-of-civilians/

    Africa, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 28, 2011
  • Fundamentals Of Protecting Civilians
    By Alison Giffen
    Henry L. Stimson Center
    Published April 7, 2011

    President Obama has used the protection of civilians as the primary rationale for initiating military action in Libya, with the support of the UN Security Council. Libya isn't the only country in crisis where interventions have been undertaken with an explicit objective to protect civilians. Ten UN peacekeeping operations have been authorized to use force to protect civilians - most recently in the Ivory Coast, where attack helicopters are being used to neutralize artillery that could be used against civilians in Abidjan. Beyond peacekeeping, the Coalition commanders in Afghanistan have released tactical directives on the protection of civilians. 

    The U.S. Administration, for political and practical reasons, is working to clarify what it means by the "protection of civilians," why it is a U.S. strategic interest and when and how the concept should be applied. President Obama began to address these issues in his March 28 speech at the National Defense University. But messaging is important insofar as words are followed by deeds on the ground.

    The What

    The concept of Protection of Civilians has primarily been used to describe activities undertaken during consent-based interventions such as UN peacekeeping operations mandated and authorized to use force to protect civilians (as defined by international humanitarian law) under imminent threat of physical violence. The Obama Administration and the Security Council have now used the concept as the rationale for the non-consensual intervention in Libya. Given non-consensual interventions directly challenge international norms of sovereignty and usually require the application of greater military force, they are inherently more controversial and carry a different set of risks then consent-based interventions to protect civilians. The Administration and its allies would be well served to make a distinction between consent-based and non-consensual interventions to protect civilians so that the successes or failures of one do not undermine or artificially accelerate progress on the other.

    The Why

    Although the U.S. government has begun to adopt policies to prevent and respond to atrocities, guidance and doctrine (specific to the protection of civilians) for deployed military have yet to be developed. With such uncertainty, why should the United States and the international community risk action?  There are moral, legal, practical and strategic reasons.

    -     In the 28 March speech, the President said "if we waited one more day, Benghazi ... could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world."

    -     Leaders have also raised legal reasons, sighting international humanitarian and human rights laws and nascent norms that outline an international responsibility to protect.

    -     "The writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution's future credibility to uphold global peace and security."  (President Obama, March 28, 2011)

    The third reason - practical and strategic - is the most critical. In today's conflicts, failing to act undermines the legitimacy and credibility of governments and inter-governmental bodies. A UN or coalition failure in one arena has implications for its actions in others.

    Why is legitimacy and credibility so important in today's conflicts? The revolution in communication technology allows the capture and transmission of real or rumored abuses and atrocities in real time. This information has altered civilian engagement and influence in the outcome of war. How the conflicting parties, and international actors that intervene, are perceived affects how stakeholders on the ground (civilians that can either support a nascent state or an armed actor that challenges that state) and around the globe (voters and tax payers that are needed to support politicians and programs that fund interventions abroad) see their interests.  

    The How

    The international community has to adhere to at least three fundamentals in an intervention that aims to protect civilians:

    1)  Political Strategy. Military power remains a blunt instrument that is primarily designed to defeat an enemy, not to protect civilians. Although doctrine and guidance is being considered to guide militaries, sustainable peace and protection of rights requires a political strategy to decide whether military force is being used to freeze a conflict in order to bring parties to the table or to mitigate the risk to civilians while a conflict plays out. Once conflict ebbs, what strategy will bring diverse stakeholders to the table to find an appropriate way forward?

    2) Positioning. The intervention should provide protection in an impartial fashion. In other words, the decision on whether and how to intervene should be primarily based on stopping the atrocity, not on who is perpetrating it. In the case of Libya, that means being clear that NATO is not siding with one armed actor or another and will protect civilians regardless of who is attacking them. Such a position can help deter rebels from targeting civilians or undertaking offensive operations that may harm civilians (beyond the bounds of international humanitarian law) and combat assertions that the operation is being undertaken for spurious reasons.

    3) Planning.   Effective planning for protection operations is critical to their success. If the protection of civilians is the principal objective of the operation, then every political, economic and military course of action must be designed to reduce harm to civilians. Such planning requires a deep understanding of the conflict dynamics. A very condensed summary of planning considerations include:

    →     Identify which civilians are at risk, why and what actions they might take to protect themselves.

    →     Identify who is threatening or perpetrating violence against civilians, why and how.

    →     Choose courses of action that A) undermine or remove the ability of the perpetrators to attack civilians and  B) reduce the vulnerability of the civilians at risk.

    →     Anticipate and plan to mitigate potential negative consequences of these actions (in the short, medium and long-term) to civilians.

    Looking Ahead

    The President's 28 March speech at NDU touched on almost every fundamental outlined above - looking to a political solution and avoiding the issue of regime change through military power. Thus far, the NATO coalition seems to be following the fundamentals. But given the fact that several nations in the coalition - including the United States - have declared that regime change is a national policy goal, pressures to (a) arm or train rebels on one side of the conflict, (b) cobble together peace agreements that may be contested, and/or (c) legitimize governments that may be unrepresentative and corrupt could well contribute to further violence and abuse. Such actions undermine all three of the fundamentals outlined above and could tarnish the credibility and legitimacy of the protection of civilian doctrine, and the coalition effort as well.

    Calls by the United States and allies for Qadhafi to step down should be separate from the military operation, based on his clear violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law, and part of a political strategy that differentiates between Qadhafi and those directly responsible for abuses, and others who may need to be included in Libya's future government. 

    link to: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/fundamentals-of-protecting-civilians/

    Protection of Civilians, All Regions | Posted April 28, 2011
  • No Will, No Way: US-funded Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    Oxfam America
    Published October 26, 2010

    This paper is a follow-up case study to Oxfam America’s 2009 report on US security assistance and the protection of civilians. In that report, Oxfam America examined the importance of SSR and the evolution of US policy and doctrine and then surveyed US practice. DRC is an important and useful case study of US implementation of SSR because the US government has committed to improving the security of the Congolese and to helping promote development and democracy in DRC, and SSR is crucial to solving the problems in the country. The US has provided tens of millions of dollars in support of armed forces and police reform in the DRC, yet the impact of the US efforts has not been measured and thus is not actually known. Moreover, notwithstanding these and other donor efforts, it is clear that true reform in the DRC security sector has yet to occur: “No progress at all,” according to one senior MONUC official. True reform, including the training of all security forces in civilian protection and human rights principles and the implementation of that training in field operations, plus effective application of military justice and measures to remove known human rights abusers from the army and the implementation of a judicial system based on the rule of law, is crucial to improving the humanitarian situation in DRC and moving DRC to a position of stability, economic development, and robust democracy.

    Africa, Security Sector Reform | Posted October 27, 2010
  • UN Panels of Experts and UN Peace Operations: Exploiting Synergies for Peacebuilding
    By Alix J. Boucher
    Henry L. Stimson Center
    Published October 20, 2010

    Drawing on research and interviews conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Washington, and New York, UN Panels of Experts and UN Peace Operations: Exploiting Synergies for Peacebuilding examines cooperation between Panels and peace operations for those countries, the potential synergies that cooperation already brings to international peacebuilding efforts in those settings, and the challenges that sanctions present for donors.

    Because the various Security Council resolutions that mandate sanctions, peace operations and Panels of Experts clearly delineate mutually reinforcing objectives, this report works from the assumption that increased cooperation between Panels and peace operations would advance the cause of peace and security in the places where these entities both work.

    Since 2006, the Future of Peace Operations program has contributed to independent research on improving the United Nations' capacity to build the rule of law, especially in countries where it deploys peace support operations. In particular, Stimson has looked at the role of spoilers in derailing peace processes and the operational responses at the UN Security Council's disposal in responding to such threats.

    Stimson's initial research found that the Security Council frequently uses two distinct but related operational tools: UN peace support operations and Panels of Experts, which are small investigative teams appointed to monitor targeted sanctions imposed on peace spoilers. In its previous report on this topic, Targeting Spoilers: the Role of United Nations Panels of Experts, Alix Boucher and Victoria Holt shed light on these expert Panels and the challenges they face, and offered suggestions for ensuring that their numerous findings and recommendations receive follow up.

    Based on that research, this report highlights the benefits and challenges of cooperation, and offers recommendations for improving the way these two Security Council tools work with each other, with Member States, and with the Security Council. In doing so, the report seeks to catalyze a more strategic approach to peacebuilding by the Security Council.

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted September 17, 2010
  • Freedom from Fear: Regional action to protect civilians in LRA-affected areas
    Oxfam International
    Published October 15, 2010

    Tens of thousands of people will remain without life-saving aid unless the UN mission in DR Congo steps up its presence in areas brutalized by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). The horrific experiences of the communities in the Great Lakes directly affected by the LRA demand that the UN bear three harsh realities in mind:

    1. The LRA is a regional problem, requiring a concerted regional and international response.

    2. The problem is not going to go away: a failure to direct efforts and resources towards it now will only increase the scale of the human catastrophe to be addressed later.

    3. Current efforts are ineffective at protecting civilians and can even inadvertently put civilians at greater risk: the protection of the civilians caught up in this crisis cannot be left to chance – or to the communities themselves.

    That the US government, the World Bank, the UN, AU and EU have recently moved the issue of the LRA higher up their respective agendas is potentially good news for the many LRA-affected communities. Turning that potential into reality, however, is going to take considerably greater political will, coordination and far-sightedness than has so far characterised the international and regional response to the LRA.

    Recommendations

    Contact Group members should promote coordinated national and international action to address the threat the LRA poses to civilians across the region.

    Make better use of existing resources: peacekeeping missions must review their strategies in response to the LRA threat and establish effective cross-mission coordination on protecting civilians; coordination with humanitarian actors on security must be improved to enable an expansion of assistance; national armies must be adequately supported and disciplined to offer increased protection to civilians; revive the role of an AU or UN Special Envoy to LRA-affected areas as part of enhanced non-military action to promote disarmament.

    Increase resources commensurate with needs: more international and national protection actors must be deployed to the areas where the civilian population is most at risk; the delivery of humanitarian assistance should be significantly increased; the structural vulnerabilities of the affected areas should be addressed through a targeted road-building/road rehabilitation program, combined with a major expansion of communications infrastructure (mobile phone coverage); early warning systems linked to improved response capacity are needed, with regard for the risks they can pose to civilians.

    Address the risks of any military action: civilian protection should be at the centre of international and regional action to address the threat of the LRA, under a shared strategy involving national armed forces and peacekeeping missions in the region that takes account of the capacities of each.

    Contacts:

    Anna Ridout, Press Officer, Oxfam, l: +44 (0)1865 473415, m: +44 (0)7766 443506, aridout@oxfam.org.uk

    Louis Belanger, Oxfam Humanitarian Media Lead, t: +1 212 687 2678; m: +1 917 224 0834 louis.belanger@oxfaminternational.org, @louis_press

    Africa, Protection of Civilians, UN Peace Operations | Posted October 21, 2010

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