Reports: African Union Peacekeeping

This paper, the second in a series on Security Council working methods and the performance of peace
operations, addresses the Council’s engagement in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) from early 2006 to the end of 2010. While the Council explored options for deploying some sort of UN peacekeeping presence to these countries from mid-2006 onwards, these discussions were secondary to much higher-profile debates about the possibility of a large-scale force in Darfur. After Chad had stated its initial opposition to a UN military deployment, France initiated proposals for the deployments of an EU
military mission linked to a UN police presence to Chad and CAR in mid-2007.
After lengthy negotiations, the two organizations deployed in early 2008, and operated in parallel until March 2009. The EU mission then closed, following a pre-arranged schedule, while the UN mission (MINURCAT) deployed a military presence. However, Chad put a growing number of obstacles in MINURCAT’s way, and eventually withdrew its consent altogether. MINURCAT ended its operations in
December 2010.
The goal of this paper is to show how the Security Council’s working methods affected its dealings with Chad and CAR prior to the launch of MINURCAT and the parallel EU mission (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and its oversight of the two operations from 2008 to 2010. While the two missions’ performance was shaped by multiple contextual factors (and in EUFOR’s case, European politics) it offers lessons about the relevance of working methods to an operation’s effectiveness. This is particularly true because MINURCAT was subject to almost constant political pressure from the government of Chad, and the Council’s working methods inevitably shaped elements of its response to this pressure.

During the last decade, peace operation partnerships between the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations have advanced considerably both in operational and institutional terms. With the growing involvement of regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping, coordination between the UN and its potential partners is important in order to avoid duplication or outright inter-organizational rivalry. Recognizing that institutionalised relations between the UN and emerging peacekeeping actors such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and even NATO can lead to beneficial burdensharing and mutual reinforcement, organizations have made conscious efforts to move from ad-hoc cooperation to more permanent and predictable mechanisms. Effective peace operations partnerships depend on coherent and strategically structured relations at the inter-secretariat level: different organizational cultures, agendas and approaches need to be systematically integrated. Despite some progress in UN-EU, UN-AU and UN-NATO relations, significant challenges persist in designing, maintaining and improving interorganizational schemes for peace operations.

In addition to reviewing developments relating to protection of civilians as a thematic issue on the Security Council’s agenda, including in the context of UN peacekeeping, the present report includes a statistical analysis of Council decisions in country-specific situations in 2010 and how protection issues were addressed. The Secretary-General’s reporting on protection of civilians, as well as the Council’s use of sanctions against individuals or entities committing violations against civilians are
also reviewed. The two case studies —on Côte d’Ivoire and Libya—are actually from 2011. They were included, however, because of their obvious importance. They offer contrasting perspectives on recent Council action to protect civilians and a more in-depth and comprehensive analysis than what the statistical analysis is able to provide.

Summary

The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda’s bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department’s East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union’s (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country’s nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area.

Congress has appropriated increasing counterterrorism assistance for Africa over the past decade, and has demonstrated continued interest in both the nature of the terrorist threat and efforts to counter it through hearings, investigations, and legislation. Questions have been raised regarding

• the level of U.S. funding and personnel dedicated to these efforts;
• the underlying assumptions on which these programs have been developed;
• cooperation between implementing agencies; and
• the extent to which U.S. programs actually prevent or mitigate radicalization,
• recruitment, and support for violent extremist organizations.

This report provides an overview of current U.S. counterterrorism assistance programs and influence operations in East Africa and explores some of the strategies underpinning them. It also provides a brief description of the evolving terrorist threat in the region. The security cooperation and civil affairs activities of the U.S. military in the region have grown substantially in the past decade, primarily in response to these threats, and the report explores the various roles of the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, among other agencies, in implementing counterterrorism and counterextremism programs in the region. The report does not address covert or clandestine operations to collect intelligence or capture or eliminate terrorist targets in the region.

Related legislation includes several bills introduced in the aftermath of the July 2010 Kampala bombings: H.Con.Res. 303, H.Res. 1538, H.Res. 1596, and H.Res. 1708, as well as S.Res. 573, on Somalia; S. 3757, on Ethiopia; and H.Res. 1708, on Eritrea. For further information, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins; CRS Report RL33911, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, by Ted Dagne; and CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.