Reports by region: Africa

This issue brief provides an overview of the legal, political, and operational frameworks protecting children from the effects of armed conflict, notably from violations by nonstate armed groups. The UN Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized the need to “more consistently and effectively engage non-State armed groups in order to improve their compliance with the law,” including international human rights and international humanitarian law. This is of particular importance with regard to child protection as armed conflicts have far-reaching impacts on children, who are among the most vulnerable members of society.

The report explores some of the limitations of these frameworks and their mechanisms, and discusses ways to maximize the comparative advantages of different actors when engaging nonstate armed groups to improve the protection of children’s rights.

In part of the conclusion, the authors write:

"A concerted and strategic use of complementary approaches, including those outside of the monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) framework, would contribute to improved protection of children from the effects of armed conflicts. Such “strategic complementarity” would help maximize the comparative advantages of each actor for different purposes: to overcome access problems, notably when the states concerned are opposed to the UN’s engagement with nonstate armed groups; to develop specific responses tailored to the characteristics and sensitivities of each nonstate armed group; and to offer alternative approaches to overcoming nonstate armed groups’ perceptions of some actors’ bias in particular contexts. Such alternative approaches already exist but are seemingly overlooked in the MRM framework. Better interaction with actors operating outside the MRM would respond to the legitimate concerns of duplicating efforts and sending mixed messages on the applicable standards."

This report is based on research conducted in Khartoum, Juba, Washington, and elsewhere in the aftermath of Sudan’s 2011 referendum. It seeks to answer a simple question: Why was the2011 referendum on the secession of southern Sudan largely peaceful despite predictions for renewed civil war? The report examines possible answers and attempts to formulate lessons for global conflict prevention that may emerge from the peaceful Sudan referendum experience.- Numerous predictions asserted that the referendum on the secession of southern Sudan would lead to renewed civil war.- Despite ongoing violence in many parts of Sudan and South Sudan, the referendum process was largely peaceful.

- Numerous predictions asserted that the referendum on the secession of southern Sudan would lead to renewed civil war.

- Despite ongoing violence in many parts of Sudan and South Sudan, the referendum process
was largely peaceful.

- This unanticipated result may prove a relatively rare instance of documented success in conflict prevention.

- Warnings of impending violence came from many sources. They were timely but tended to be vague. Whether they were overly dire because of faulty assumptions about the conflict dynamics deserves scrutiny.

- Two prominent narratives explain why the referendum process was peaceful: one that emphasizes domestic factors and another that focuses on international intervention by Africans and westerners. It is highly likely that both contain important explanations for the peaceful referendum.

- People in Sudan and South Sudan tend to emphasize the domestic narrative; members of the international community tend to focus on international engagement.

Several lessons for global conflict prevention can be drawn from the Sudan referendum experience:   

    - Preventing conflict in what seems like dire circumstances is possible.    

    - Coordinated outside actions should support local conflict-mitigating dynamics.    

    - Technical actions, such as election or referendum logistics, can have a significant positive impact on political processes.   

    - International actors need to be receptive to taking preventive action.   

    - Focusing on successes, as well as failures, is critical.

Summary

Problem Identified
Peacebuilding operations in conflict and post-conflict societies often undermine local capacity, ownership, and sustainability. The acknowledged remedy is to empower local actors to take the lead in planning and implementing programs, but few empowerment strategies that work in practice have been documented and explained.

Action Taken
- Several organizations have reconfigured empowerment techniques traditionally used for peacetime development to work in societies emerging from conflict.
- Local actors have seized the chance presented by these new approaches to develop and implement their own creative solutions to conflict. Local ownership has in turn enabled the integration of other sectors of society and government into peacebuilding activities.

Lessons Learned
- Focus on facilitating processes instead of trying to achieve specific outcomes. Successful interventions help participants open channels to defend their own interests, with the participants determining the final decisions and outcomes.
- Design programs to promote learning rather than to yield specific results. Effective programs create opportunities for participants to seek out and absorb knowledge critical to good decision making.
- Don’t be deflected by political pressures. Even well-known empowerment principles (such as respecting local counterparts) can be sidelined if interveners do not prioritize them above the kinds of political pressures typically encountered in conflict zones.

The past year could have been a disastrous one for U.N. peacekeeping. Twelve months ago, Côte d’Ivoire appeared to be on the brink of renewed civil war in spite of the presence there of United Nations and French forces. South Sudan’s vote for independence in January 2011 also had the potential to unleash mass violence. From Haiti to Liberia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeepers were charged with overseeing elections that might have resulted in significant instability. In Somalia, U.N.-mandated African Union (AU) forces were locked in grinding combat with Islamist al-Shabab rebels. 

Yet peace operations demonstrated an unexpected degree of resilience overall, as chronicled in the Center on International Cooperation’s new Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. The U.N. reasserted itself in Côte d’Ivoire, and though presidential polls in the DRC proved to be deeply flawed, those in Haiti and Liberia were conducted relatively smoothly thanks in part to the U.N. In Somalia, al-Shabab pulled back from Mogadishu as the AU forces took the initiative. Other regional organizations also found themselves being drawn into peace operations: The Arab League sent an admittedly ill-fated observer mission to Syria, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations mandated an observer mission to help reduce tensions on the Thai-Cambodian border.