Peacekeeping Reports

Below you will find a compilation of reports related to international peacekeeping, including the latest and most relevant research and information from PEP Partners and Academics, as well as the UN, U.S. Government and Foreign Governments.

Note: The PEP report library is a “comprehensive compilation in progress.” We encourage PEP Partners to submit relevant reports for inclusion on the site.

The Latest Reports

  • DR Congo: Local Communities on the Front Line
    By Erin Weir and Peter Orr
    Published April 25, 2012

    The day-to-day reality for ordinary people in the Democratic Republic of Congo includes all of the following: latent insecurity, ongoing military operations, and systematic attacks by armed groups – including units of the Congolese military. The international community has been providing humanitarian assistance to the DRC for over a decade and a half, but the need remains acute. The local UN peacekeeping operation (MONUSCO) dedicates the majority of its scarce resources to the protection of civilians, and will need to maintain this critical effort for the foreseeable future. Creative protection efforts by the peacekeepers need to be reinforced and supported. Protection monitoring and coordination efforts – led by the UN Refugee Agency – also need to be repaired.

    Erin Weir and Peter Orr assessed the humanitarian conditions and security situation in the DRC in March 2012 and came to the following policy conclusions:

    - The U.S. and ECHO should provide funds to restore UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) protection monitoring staff in North Kivu to prior levels.
    - Donor governments should call on UNHCR – in its capacity as Protection Cluster lead – to strengthen its work on IDP protection. UNHCR protection monitors should be given the task of tracking IDP movements in order to reinforce OCHA’s information gathering, strengthen overall capacity to project the scale of displacement, and respond with timely and adequate assistance.
    - The U.S. should identify bilateral funding – in addition to the assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping dedicated specifically for the support of additional Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), communications equipment, and transportation.
    - Donor countries – specifically the U.S., the UK, and the EU – and their institutions must coordinate priorities and key conditions for ongoing support to the government of the DRC. Coordinated offers of funding for development projects must be predicated upon progress in the areas of corruption and impunity, as well as a concrete demonstration of will and a plan to make progress in key areas such as the reform of security sector institutions.

    Africa, PoC with Responsibility to Protect, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Protection of Civilians, Security Sector Reform, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 25, 2012
  • Learning from Sudan's 2011 Referendum
    By Joe Temin and Lawrence Woocher
    Published April 16, 2012

    This report is based on research conducted in Khartoum, Juba, Washington, and elsewhere in the aftermath of Sudan’s 2011 referendum. It seeks to answer a simple question: Why was the2011 referendum on the secession of southern Sudan largely peaceful despite predictions for renewed civil war? The report examines possible answers and attempts to formulate lessons for global conflict prevention that may emerge from the peaceful Sudan referendum experience.- Numerous predictions asserted that the referendum on the secession of southern Sudan would lead to renewed civil war.- Despite ongoing violence in many parts of Sudan and South Sudan, the referendum process was largely peaceful.

    - Numerous predictions asserted that the referendum on the secession of southern Sudan would lead to renewed civil war.

    - Despite ongoing violence in many parts of Sudan and South Sudan, the referendum process
    was largely peaceful.

    - This unanticipated result may prove a relatively rare instance of documented success in conflict prevention.

    - Warnings of impending violence came from many sources. They were timely but tended to be vague. Whether they were overly dire because of faulty assumptions about the conflict dynamics deserves scrutiny.

    - Two prominent narratives explain why the referendum process was peaceful: one that emphasizes domestic factors and another that focuses on international intervention by Africans and westerners. It is highly likely that both contain important explanations for the peaceful referendum.

    - People in Sudan and South Sudan tend to emphasize the domestic narrative; members of the international community tend to focus on international engagement.

    Several lessons for global conflict prevention can be drawn from the Sudan referendum experience:   

        - Preventing conflict in what seems like dire circumstances is possible.    

        - Coordinated outside actions should support local conflict-mitigating dynamics.    

        - Technical actions, such as election or referendum logistics, can have a significant positive impact on political processes.   

        - International actors need to be receptive to taking preventive action.   

        - Focusing on successes, as well as failures, is critical.

    Africa | Posted April 16, 2012
  • Security Council Working Methods and UN Peace Operations: The Case of Chad and CAR, 2006-2010
    By Alexandra Novosseloff and Richard Gowan
    Published April 11, 2012

    This paper, the second in a series on Security Council working methods and the performance of peace
    operations, addresses the Council’s engagement in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) from early 2006 to the end of 2010. While the Council explored options for deploying some sort of UN peacekeeping presence to these countries from mid-2006 onwards, these discussions were secondary to much higher-profile debates about the possibility of a large-scale force in Darfur. After Chad had stated its initial opposition to a UN military deployment, France initiated proposals for the deployments of an EU
    military mission linked to a UN police presence to Chad and CAR in mid-2007.
    After lengthy negotiations, the two organizations deployed in early 2008, and operated in parallel until March 2009. The EU mission then closed, following a pre-arranged schedule, while the UN mission (MINURCAT) deployed a military presence. However, Chad put a growing number of obstacles in MINURCAT’s way, and eventually withdrew its consent altogether. MINURCAT ended its operations in
    December 2010.
    The goal of this paper is to show how the Security Council’s working methods affected its dealings with Chad and CAR prior to the launch of MINURCAT and the parallel EU mission (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and its oversight of the two operations from 2008 to 2010. While the two missions’ performance was shaped by multiple contextual factors (and in EUFOR’s case, European politics) it offers lessons about the relevance of working methods to an operation’s effectiveness. This is particularly true because MINURCAT was subject to almost constant political pressure from the government of Chad, and the Council’s working methods inevitably shaped elements of its response to this pressure.

    Africa, African Union Peacekeeping, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 11, 2012
  • Strengthening Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation: Istanbul Retreat of UNSC
    By Arthur Boutellis and Christoph Mikulaschek
    Published April 11, 2012

    In early July 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey hosted an informal retreat
    for members of the United Nations Security Council in Istanbul. The retreat gathered ambassadorial-level representatives of the Security Council together with several member states that were not members of the council at the time, senior officials of the United Nations Secretariat, and independent experts to discuss ways to strengthen preventive diplomacy and mediation. In an informal setting and under the Chatham House rule of nonattribution, the discussion sought to build on and enrich the ongoing debate on how best to realize the full potential of preventive diplomacy and mediation as cost-effective options for dealing with crises. The exchange of views benefited from insights gained at the first Istanbul Retreat for members of the Security Council in June 2010. It drew, as well, on lessons learned from recent and ongoing crises and conflicts that have taxed the council’s capacities for maintaining international peace and security.

    PoC with Responsibility to Protect, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Protection of Civilians, Security Sector Reform, UN Peace Operations | Posted April 11, 2012
  • Security Sector Reform in Tunisia: A Year after the Jasmine Revolution
    By Querine Hanlon
    Published March 30, 2012

    The U.S. Institute of Peace Security Sector Governance Center is engaged in a funded study of the prospects for security sector reform in North Africa. In January 2012, Querine Hanlon, Daniel Brumberg, and Robert Perito traveled to Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. This report is the first in a series of country-focused reports on security sector reform in North Africa.

    Summary: 

    - In the year since its revolution, Tunisia has achieved what no other Arab Spring country has managed: peaceful transition to democratic rule through national elections widely viewed to be free and fair.
    - The legacy of the previous regime remains, however: a complete lack of transparency, no real parliamentary or government oversight, and unchanged rules of engagement and training.
    - Reorienting the mandate and institutional culture of security institutions is imperative.
    - Most in need of reform are the police and gendarme and the Ministry of Interior.
    - Tunisia’s internal security services are feared by the population and are themselves fearful of fulfilling their basic police tasks.
    - How the ministry and its forces engage with citizens and with the executive and the legislature is also in urgent need of reform.
    - Restoration of police services will help restore the confidence of the police and the public trust in the government.
    - Tunisia needs no lessons about subordinating the military to civilian control.
    - Security sector reform is critical if Tunisia’s transition to democracy is to succeed in the long term.

    Middle East, Security Sector Reform | Posted March 30, 2012
  • Empowering Local Peacebuilders
    Published March 26, 2012

    Summary

    Problem Identified
    Peacebuilding operations in conflict and post-conflict societies often undermine local capacity, ownership, and sustainability. The acknowledged remedy is to empower local actors to take the lead in planning and implementing programs, but few empowerment strategies that work in practice have been documented and explained.

    Action Taken
    - Several organizations have reconfigured empowerment techniques traditionally used for peacetime development to work in societies emerging from conflict.
    - Local actors have seized the chance presented by these new approaches to develop and implement their own creative solutions to conflict. Local ownership has in turn enabled the integration of other sectors of society and government into peacebuilding activities.

    Lessons Learned
    - Focus on facilitating processes instead of trying to achieve specific outcomes. Successful interventions help participants open channels to defend their own interests, with the participants determining the final decisions and outcomes.
    - Design programs to promote learning rather than to yield specific results. Effective programs create opportunities for participants to seek out and absorb knowledge critical to good decision making.
    - Don’t be deflected by political pressures. Even well-known empowerment principles (such as respecting local counterparts) can be sidelined if interveners do not prioritize them above the kinds of political pressures typically encountered in conflict zones.

    PoC with Responsibility to Protect, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Protection of Civilians, Security Sector Reform, All Regions, UN Peace Operations, US Gov't Peacekeeping Issues | Posted March 26, 2012
  • Peace Operations Partnerships: Complex but Necessary Cooperation
    By Richard Gowan and Jake Sherman
    Published March 19, 2012

    In a short paper for the Center for International Peace Operations, the German think-tank, Jake Sherman and Richard Gowan argue that as NATO pulls back from Afghanistan and the UN downsizes some missions (including those in Haiti and the Congo) organizations including the AU, Arab League and ASEAN may take more responsibility for new peace operations.

    In cases including Afghanistan, Kosovo, Somalia and the Congo, multiple organizations are working together to consolidate stability and build functioning states. Although NATO and the UN are the main actors in global peace operations today, it is likely that a variety of other organizations including the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will play an increasingly prominent role in the future. These actors will need a great deal of help, ranging from military assistance to administrative back-up. The UN, NATO and EU will be called upon to play significant supporting roles. Managing these complex partnerships will be essential to making existing and new peace operations succeed.

    African Union Peacekeeping, NATO & EU Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping Doctrine, Protection of Civilians, Security Sector Reform, All Regions, UN Peace Operations, US Gov't Peacekeeping Issues | Posted March 19, 2012
  • Briefing Paper: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012
    Published March 16, 2012

    The past year could have been a disastrous one for U.N. peacekeeping. Twelve months ago, Côte d’Ivoire appeared to be on the brink of renewed civil war in spite of the presence there of United Nations and French forces. South Sudan’s vote for independence in January 2011 also had the potential to unleash mass violence. From Haiti to Liberia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeepers were charged with overseeing elections that might have resulted in significant instability. In Somalia, U.N.-mandated African Union (AU) forces were locked in grinding combat with Islamist al-Shabab rebels. 

    Yet peace operations demonstrated an unexpected degree of resilience overall, as chronicled in the Center on International Cooperation’s new Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. The U.N. reasserted itself in Côte d’Ivoire, and though presidential polls in the DRC proved to be deeply flawed, those in Haiti and Liberia were conducted relatively smoothly thanks in part to the U.N. In Somalia, al-Shabab pulled back from Mogadishu as the AU forces took the initiative. Other regional organizations also found themselves being drawn into peace operations: The Arab League sent an admittedly ill-fated observer mission to Syria, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations mandated an observer mission to help reduce tensions on the Thai-Cambodian border.

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted March 16, 2012
  • Peace Operations Partnerships: The UN Security Council and (Sub-)Regional Organizations
    By Mauricio Artiñano
    Published March 16, 2012

    Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has consistently partnered with regional and subregional organizations around the world within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, including through the authorization of peace operations by these organizations. Enhanced consultation and more fluid interaction between the Council and regional organizations can have an immediate impact on the successful conduct of peace operations on the ground and would also improve long-term trust and cooperation between the Council and its partners. This policy brief sets out several recommendations for the Council and regional partners to consider in order to improve cooperation at the strategic and political level on the planning, management and oversight of peace operations. The recommendations aim to strike a realistic balance between the demands of certain regional organizations for a more horizontal relationship with the Council, and the wariness of some permanent members of the Council towards such proposals.

    All Regions, UN Peace Operations | Posted March 16, 2012
  • Peace Operations Partnerships: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms between Secretariats
    By Joachim Koops
    Published March 16, 2012

    During the last decade, peace operation partnerships between the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations have advanced considerably both in operational and institutional terms. With the growing involvement of regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping, coordination between the UN and its potential partners is important in order to avoid duplication or outright inter-organizational rivalry. Recognizing that institutionalised relations between the UN and emerging peacekeeping actors such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and even NATO can lead to beneficial burdensharing and mutual reinforcement, organizations have made conscious efforts to move from ad-hoc cooperation to more permanent and predictable mechanisms. Effective peace operations partnerships depend on coherent and strategically structured relations at the inter-secretariat level: different organizational cultures, agendas and approaches need to be systematically integrated. Despite some progress in UN-EU, UN-AU and UN-NATO relations, significant challenges persist in designing, maintaining and improving interorganizational schemes for peace operations.

    African Union Peacekeeping, NATO & EU Peacekeeping, Peacekeeping Doctrine, All Regions, UN Peace Operations, US Gov't Peacekeeping Issues | Posted March 19, 2012

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